Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1988

Ellison, Inc. v. Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission of Utah and Department of
Employement Security : Petition for Writ of
Certiorari
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Dexter L. Anderson; attorney for petitioner.
David L. Wilkinson; attorney general; Lorin R. Blauer; assistant attorney general; attorneys for
respondents.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Ellison Inc v. Board of Review, No. 880126.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2045

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

. JTAH SUPROCS COURT
BRIEF
jTAW
XDCWMENT
N THE SUPREME COURT OP UTAH

29
DOCKET NO.

ELLISON, INC.
Employer-Petitioner
Petition for Writ
of Certiorari
Category 6

vs.
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH AND DEPARTMENT
OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY,
Respondents.

Petitioner's Petition for Writ of
Certiorari for Review of the
Circuit Court of Appeals
Opinion in Case No. 870034-CA

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
DEXTER L. ANDERSON
Attorney at Law
S. R. Box 52
Fillmore, UT 84631
Attorney for EmployerPetitioner

LORIN R. BLAUER, -0366
Special Assistant
Attorney General
1234 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84147
Attorney for Respondents

I)

HQLtA.

Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

OPINION ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS . . . .

1

JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS

1

CONTROLLING PROVISIONS

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

5

ARGUMENT

6

APPENDIX A - Opinion.
APPENDIX B - Authorities.
APPENDIX C - Transcript of Hearing.
APPENDIX D - Decision of Administrative Law Judge.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Appendix B)
Page
1.
2.

Anderson vs. Industrial Commission
696 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1985)

6,7f8

Brunnell vs. Industrial Commission
740 P.2d 1331 (Utah 19872

7,8

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I
Did the Department of Employment Security deny Petitioner Ellison, Inc. its constitutional rights to a fair and
impartial tribunal and a fair hearing where the Department's Administrative Law Judge acted as both the attorney
and prosecutor for the Department and also as the Tribunal
sitting as the trier of fact and law?

Particularly where

the Department had on its payroll attorneys who could have
readily represented the Department?
II
OPINION ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
(Appendix A)
The opinion issued herein by the Court of Appeals is
found at 76 Utah Advanced Reports, 13, (Ct. App. 02/19/88).
Ill
JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS
Jurisdiction in this Court is based on U.C.A. 78-22(3)(a) and Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Rule 43.
A.
The entry date of the decision sought to be
reviewed is February 19, 1988.
B.
An extension was granted by this Court for
the filing of this Petition to April 19, 1988.
IV
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
1.

United States Constitution Amendments 5 and 14 as

follows:
-1-

Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital , or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in
the Militia, when in actual service in time of War
or public danger; nor shall any person be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.
Amendment XIV
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
2.

Constitution of Utah Article I, Section 7 as

follows:
Due Process of Law. No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.
3.

Utah Code Annotated 35-4-10, as amended.

Review

of decision or determination, appeal referees, Board of
Review, witness fees, judicial review by Court of Appeals,
and exclusive procedure as follows:
(a)
A review of a decision or determination involving contribution liability or applications for refund shall be made by the commission
or its authorized representative in accordance
with the provisions of this act. The decision of
the representative conducting the review is deemed
the decision of the commission. The commission or
its authorized representative conducting the
-2-

review may refer the matter to an appeal referee,
may decide the application for review on the basis
of any facts and information as may be obtained or
may, in its discretion, hear argument or hold a
hearing to secure further facts. After the
review, notice of the decision shall be given to
the employing unit
The decision made pursuant to
the review is the final decision of the commission
unless, within ten days after the date of notification or mailing of the decision,
further appeal
is Initiated under the provision?. -,t this section.
(b) Within ten days after the mailing 01*
personal delivery of a notice of a determination
or decision rendered following a review under subsection (a), an employing unit may appeal to an
appeal referee by filing a notice of appeal. The
appeal referee shall give notice of the pendency
of the appeal to the commission, which is then a
party to the proceedings. After affording the
parties reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing,
he shall make findings and conclusions and on that
basis affirm, modify, or reverse the determination. The parties shall be promptly notified of
the referee's decision and furnished a copy of the
decision and findings. The decision is the final
decision of the commission unless within ten days
after the date of mailing of notice to the parties1 last known addresses or in the absence of a
mailing within ten days after the delivery of
notice, further appeal is initiated under th^ provisions of this section.
The commission shall appoint one
more impartial appeal referees consisting in
each case of a salaried referee selected in
accordance with Section 35-4-11(d) to hear and
decide referrals or appeals relating to claims for
benefits or to decisions affecting employing units
referred to. No referee may participate in any
case in which he is an interested party. Each
decision of a referee shall represent his independent judgment
(Emphasis added)
V
STATEMENT
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"-. a petition for a Writ of Certiorari pursuant
-. - j (3) (a), Utah Code Annoted 1953, from c. cec;-
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sion of the Utah Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of
the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission which upheld an Administrative Law Judge holding that wages paid to
drivers contracting with the Employer-Petitioner, Ellison,
Inc., constitute wages for service as employment pursuant to
Subsection 35-4-22(j ) (1), 35-4-22(j ) (5 ) and 35-4-22(p) of
the Utah Employment Security Act (hereinafter "the Act11).
On May 23, 1986 a Field Auditor of the Utah Department
of Employment Security made a status determination in regard
to the Petitioner (hereinafter also referred to as "Ellison,
Inc." or "the employer"), determining that truck drivers
operating in interstate commerce as contracted by the employer were in employment under the provisions of the Utah
Employment Security Act.
Ellison, Inc. filed an appeal to the Appeals Tribunal
dated May 23, 1986.

R.0028

A hearing was held before the

Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter "ALJ") on October 6,
1986.

The ALJ issued a decision in Case No. 86-A-3577 on

October 28, 1986 affirming the decision of the Field
Auditor.
On November 6, 1986 Ellison, Inc. appealed to the
Board of Review.

R.0093-0095

The Board of Review affirmed

the decision of the ALJ on January 6, 1987 in Case No.
86-BR-549 (see Appendix C).

Appeal was taken to the Utah

Court of Appeals which affirmed on February 19, 1988.
-4-
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the hearing he announced that the exhibits were received,
(R.0046 sixth paragraph)
The ALJ then proceeded to explain and comment on each
exhibit, demonstrating that he had already reviewed and
interpreted them.

(R.0046-0048 middle of the page).

The ALJ then proceeded to call his prearranged witnesses and asked them the questions he wanted to hear answers
to.

R.0048-0050; 0054 third paragraph-0057; 0060-0064;

0067-0070; 0073-0076.
The ALJ had also apparently sent some of the exhibits
and information to the witnesses before the hearing itself
for their review.

(R.0054 last paragraph, also R.0055

bottom half of page)
Based on the evidence produced, offered, and received
by the ALJ, he then proceeded to determine the case solely
and completely in favor of the Department. R.0086-91.
VII
ARGUMENT
1.

The procedure followed by the Commission and

Department by and through their ALJ violated Petitioner's
right to fair due process as provided by the Constitution of
the United States and the State of Utah.

It also violated

the "fair hearing1 and "impartial appeal referee" provision
of U.C.A. 35-4-10.

The procedure followed also violated

this Court's mandate set forth in Anderson vs. Industrial

Commission,

69 6 P . 2 d 1219 (Utah 1985- timl Bunnell VB •
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Thus, in this case and similar cases, the Commission is one
party and the alleged employer is the other party.

Between

the two sides there must be an impartial tribunal to hear
the evidence and agrument produced by both parties, who then
determine the case in fairness to both sides.

Certainly

lack of counsel did not force the Department to rely on the
ALJ to conduct their case for them.

The Department and

Commission employ several attorneys who could have represented them as a "partyw at the hearing before the ALJ.
Under the American and State of Utah system of jurisprudence, each party is represented by an advocate who produces evidence and makes argument to an impartial tribunal
to assure a fair hearing for both parties.

This Court has

required the same in the Anderson and Bunnell cases
cited.

The Commission, the Department, and the ALJ failed

when the ALJ acted as both prosecutor for the Department and
trier of fact and law between the parties, particularly
where the Department is well represented by staff attorneys.
This Court's Writ of Certiorari must be issued to
review the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals who, without proper consideration, denied this same point on appeal.
DATED this

2 . ^ day o£^Mafdh, 1988.

DEXTER^ j^*ftt)ERSON
AttorneQ^/for EmployerPetitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy oi the
foregoing PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI to
the Attorney for the Respondents, Lorin R. Blauer, 1234
South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147, postage
pr epa i n , t 'i i s *'jjj'< day of March, 1988.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo—~
Ellison, Inc.,
Petitioner,
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OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
Board of Review of the
Industrial Commission of Utah,
Department of Employment
Security,

Case No. 870034-CA

Respondent.
Before Judges Billings, Orme and Murphy.*

FILED
FEB 191988

BILLINGS, Judge:

Ttrr.othy M. Shea
Clerk o< the Court
Uteh Court ot Appeals

Petitioner Ellison, Inc. ("Ellison") appeals from an
Industrial Commission order affirming an administrative
determination that Ellison was liable for contributions to the
Unemployment Compensation Fund on sums it paid to truck
drivers. On appeal, Ellison seeks a reversal of the
Commission's order or, alternatively, a modification of the
order limiting its scope to the four truck drivers who
testified at the administrative hearing. We affirm.
This action results from a Department of Employment
Security field audit of Ellison wherein the auditor concluded
Ellison "employed" fifteen truck drivers. Ellison petitioned
for a hearing and the appeal referee held the amounts paid to
truck drivers contracting with Ellison constituted wages for
services in employment pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-4-22(j)(l), 35-4-22(j)(5)(A)-(C), and 35-4-22(p) (1985) of
the Utah Employment Security Act ("the Act"). The appeal
referee assessed Ellison for contributions, interest, and
penalties totaling $9,698.46.
Ellison purchases hay from farms in Utah and sells it to
*

Michael R. Murphy, Judge, Third Judicial District Court,
sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-3-24(l)(j) (1987)

buyers primarily in southern California. Ellison engages truck
drivers to haul the hay to California in trucks owned by the
company, and has the drivers haul back whatever freight is
available. The drivers own no interest in Ellison and do not
share in its profits. Ellison owns the tractor/trailers and
pays all operational and maintenance costs of the vehicles.
Ellison assigns which truck the driver will operate. The
drivers are not allowed to use the trucks for personal reasons.
Whenever a load of hay is to be shipped, Ellison contacts
a driver. Ellison contracts with the truck drivers on a
purported "independent contractor11 basis. These contracts are
either oral or written. Paragraph 6(c) of the written contract
requires the driver to personally perform the services. The
driver may accept or reject the assignment. If the assignment
is accepted, the driver must deliver the load within a time
designated by Ellison. The driver picks up the truck at a
place designated by Ellison. All of the expenses, with the
exception of personal expenses, are paid by Ellison. After the
hay is delivered, the driver contacts Ellison regarding
possible freight to haul back to Utah. In most instances,
Ellison specifies the freight the driver is to pick up. The
drivers are paid according to a wage schedule set by Ellison.
This schedule delineates the wages for loading, unloading, and
driving trips between various destinations.
Four drivers testified at the administrative hearing.
The appeal referee examined each driver-witness without
objection by Ellison. Ellison, in turn, cross-examined each
driver. At the commencement of the hearing, the appeal referee
had in his possession all of the documents generated by the
field audit and received them into evidence "subject to
exception or comment." Ellison made no Objection.
The three issues presented on appeal are:
(1) Do the sums paid to the fifteen truck drivers
contracting with Ellison during the period of the
audit constitute wages for services as employment
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-22(j)(1),
35-4-22(j)(5) (1985), or are they excluded under the
ABC test of the Act?
(2)

Is the evidence sufficient to support the
administrative determination that Ellison "employed"
all fifteen truck drivers during the period of the
audit when only four of the drivers testified at the
administrative hearing?

(3) Was Ellison denied a fair and impartial hearing?
870034-CA
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UTAH EMPLOYMENT 6ECURITY ACT
Whether the truck drivers ere ••employees* within the
meaning of the Act is a mixed question of law and fact. Our role
in reviewing the Commission's findings of basic facts is limited
by Utah Code Ann. S 35-4-10(1) (1987) which provides that if the
Commission's findings of fact are supported by the evidence,
these findings are conclusive. Superior Cahlavlalon Installers.

Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 688 P.2d 444, 447 (Utah 1984).
Although we defer to the Commission's special expertise, LLtih

Pep't of Admin. 6ervs» v. Public Serv, Coram*n, 658 P.2d 601, 6io
(Utah 1983), we review its decision to determine if it falls
within the limits of reasonableness or rationality. Barnev v.

Department of Employment Bec>* 681 p.2d 1273, 1275 (Utah 1984);
Utah Pep't Of Admin. Servs., 658 P.2d at €08. Thus, *[w]e are
confined to a determination of whether the facts support the
conclusion of law or whether the decision is contrary to the
evident purpose of the statute." Barnev, 681 P.2d at 1275.
Ellison does not dispute the Commission's determination
that the truck drivers performed personal services for wages as
defined in the Act. Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-1, 35-4-22(j)(l),
35-4-22(p) (1985). Rather, Ellison contends that it is excluded
as an employer under Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-22(j)(5)(A)-(C)
(1985).!
On appeal, Ellison urges us to apply subsections (A)-(C) of
section 35-4-22(j)(5) in the disjunctive. In this way, if
Ellison satisfies the requirements for one subsection, it would
be excluded from the Act. However, case law interpreting the
application of these subsections is well settled. The
requirements of all three subsections must be satisfied in order
to exclude the employer from compliance with the Act. Nielsen v.
Department of Employment S e c , 692 P.2d 774# 776 (Utah 1984);
North Am. Builders, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Div., 22
Utah 2d 338, 340 n.l, 453 P.2d 142, 143 n.l (1969). Ellison
argues that the 1971 amendments to section 35-4-22(j)(5)(A)-(C)
resulted in a disjunctive application of the ABC test. The 1971
amendments inserted a comma in place of the word "and" at the end
of subsection (A). Ellison argues that the comma has the same
meaning as "or" and, therefore, the exclusions should be applied
disjunctively. Common sense, grammatical construction, and an
absence of any legislative history to support this construction
1. Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-22(j)(5)(A)-(C) was amended in 1986
to delete subsection (B). Subsection (C) is now the new
subsection (B). This amendment, however, is not relevant to
our decision.

870034-CA
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defeat Ellison9! position.2 fiaa Allen t A B B Q C B . V .
Industrial Comm'n, 732 P,2d 508, 509 (Utah 1987) (Utah Supreme
Court applies the AB test in the conjunctive).
The Commission determined that the truck drivers were
under Ellison9s "direction and control," and that the drivers
were not "customarily engaged in an independently established
trade • . . of the same nature as that Involved in the contract
of service.9* Therefore, the Commission concluded that neither
subsection (A) nor subsection (C) was met in this case.
Since the ABC test is conjunctive, we only discuss whether
Ellison satisfied subsection (C). There is substantial
evidence in the record to support the Commission's conclusion
that subsection (C) was not satisfied because the truck drivers
were not engaged in independently established trades.
The intent of subsection (C) is to exclude those workers
who have independently established businesses on which they can
rely should their separate employment relationships be
terminated. New Sleep, Inc. v. Department of Employment S e c ,
703 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1985), "[A)n independently established
business is one which is created and exists apart from a
relationship with a particular employer and which survives the
termination of that relationship. Its continued existence does
not depend on a relationship with any one employer. Thus, a
significant aspect of this test is the relationship between the
alleged employer and the employee." Superior Cablevision, 688
P.2d at 447.
In order to determine whether a person is "customarily
engaged in an independently established" business or trade, the
Utah Supreme Court has delineated several factors, noting the
presence of all of them, is not necessary. New Sleep, 703 P.2d
at 291. These factors include: holding oneself out to the
public generally as engaged in a particular business;
advertising one's services; having an established clientele;
having a place of business; having a contractor's or business
license; having special skills as a result of an apprenticeship
period; and having a substantial investment in tools necessary
2. In addition to deleting the "and" and inserting a comma at
the end of subsection (A), the only other change to section
35-4-22(j)(5) made in 1971 was to change an "in" to an "is."
Both changes appear corrective in nature and neither had a
substantive impact, leaving the meaning of the statute
unchanged.

870034-CA
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to do the work. £fifi, &*&!.# New Sleep. 703 P.2d at 291; Superior
Cablevision. 686 P.2d at 444;fiftinfiX*681 P.2d at 1275-76.
The following factors have been found unpersuaslve by the
Utah Supreme Court in proving the existence of an independently
established business or trade under subsection (C): part-time
work contracted for "as needed11; flat rate or fixed price
payment upon completion of the job; no set working hours; and no
obligation to take the assignment. See Hew Sleep. 703 P.2d at
290.
In the instant case, the evidence supports the Commission's
findings that the truck drivers were not Independently
established in the truck driving business. Three of the four
truck drivers who testified at the administrative hearing stated
that when they contracted to haul hay for Ellison, they hauled
exclusively for Ellison. None of the drivers owned their own
trucks. They did not hold themselves out to the public as
independent trucking concerns. They did not have a place of
business or a clientele.
Ellison relies on Barnev to support its position that the
truck drivers were "customarily engaged in an independently
established91 business of the same nature as the contract for
service. However, Barney is clearly distinguishable. In
Barney, drywall nailers and finishers pursued their skilled
trade full-time after serving four-year apprenticeships. They
maintained offices at their homes where they solicited and
accepted business and kept books, records, and tools. Based on
these characteristics, the Utah Supreme Court found these
workers were independently established.
Nielsen is more persuasive authority. In Nielsen, our
supreme court held that the claimant, one of two truck drivers
working for Nielsen, was ••employed" by Nielsen. The court found
that because the claimant did not own the truck, nor have any
ownership interest in Nielsen*s enterprise, and because the
claimant did not receive profits from Nielsen9s enterprise, but
instead performed services for wages, neither the claimant nor
the two-driver team, as an entity, was subject to exclusion
under the ABC test. Because of the factual similarities between
the claimant-driver in Nielsen and the truck drivers here, we
find Nielsen supportive of our conclusion that the truck drivers
were not independently established.

870034-CA
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Despite the fact that the written contracts designated the
truck drivers as independent contractors, we find this
designation ineffective. 6imilar characterisations were
considered in Superior Cablcvltlon* 688 P.2d at 446, and uu&h
Y» Board Of Review, 123 Utah 423, 424, 260 P;2d 744, 750
(1953) • In each instance, the court held that such provisions
"are ineffective in keeping an individual without the purview of
the Employment Security Act when by his activity he brings
himself within.*1 Ii&BLCh, 123 Utah at 434, 260 P.2d at 750. We
look beyond the plain language of the contract to the actual
status in which the parties are placed. Singer Sewing Machine
Co. v> Industrial Comm'n, 104 Utah 174, 190, 134 p.2d 479, 485
(Utah 1943).
We find that there is substantial evidence to support the
Commission's finding that the truck drivers were not
independently established in the truck driving business, thereby
satisfying subsection (C).
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Ellison contends that the evidence is insufficient to
support the appeal referee's conclusion that all fifteen drivers
working for Ellison during the period of the audit were
"employed" by Ellison within the meaning of the Act when only
four of the drivers actually testified.
Interested parties are entitled to notice of proceedings
which adequately informs them of the specific issues they must
be prepared to meet. Travlor Bros, v. Overton, 736 P.2d 1048/
1050 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Ellison had sufficient notice of the
issue to be adjudicated. The "Notice of Hearing," sent to
Ellison well in advance of the hearing,, informed Ellison that
the status of all drivers named in the audit was at issue.
Specifically, this Notice stated: "[a] hearing will be held to
determine whether individuals included in the auditor*s audit
performed a service for a wage constituting employment."
Again at the beginning of the hearing, the appeal referee
said:
[The] issue in this hearing is . . .
whether individual[s] included in the
auditor[f]s audit performed services for a
wage constituting employment under the
provisions of the Employment Security Act.
Do both parties understand the issue?
(Answers in the affirmative)
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Moreover, an exhibit introduced into evidence without Ellison's
••exception or comment" clearly identified the drivers whose
status was the subject of the hearing.
The Commission subpoenaed four of Ellison's fifteen
drivers, whose testimony the Commission used to establish the
relationship between all of the drivers and Ellison. Based upon
the testimony of these four drivers, and absent any evidence they
were somehow unique, the appeal referee concluded Ellison's
fifteen drivers performed personal services for wages as defined
by the Act* The appeal referee also concluded that the truck
drivers were under Ellison's direction or control, and were not
customarily engaged in independently established trades. If
Ellison'6 relationship with the remaining eleven drivers was
different from those of the four drivers who testified, the
burden was on Ellison to produce those drivers, or otherwise show
how their status differed. Ellison chose not to do so. There
was no evidence before the appeal referee suggesting the
remaining eleven drivers' relationship with Ellison was different
from the one described by the witnesses.
DUE PROCESS
Ellison contends he was denied a fair hearing because the
appeal referee examined the witnesses and received the
Department's audit reports into evidence. Although we
acknowledge the constitutional guarantee of due process may, in
some circumstances, be violated when the same person presents the
case for one party, cross-examines the witnesses of the other
party, and then decides the case, Burhoe v. Whaland, 356 A.2d
658, 659 (N.H. 1976), this case does not present such a
circumstance.
The documents about which Ellison complains were properly
admitted pursuant to section 35-4-6(c)(J)(2) of the Unemployment
Insurance Rules. Unemployment Insurance Rules, Utah Department
of Employment Security § 35-4-6(c)(J)(2) (1986). This section
provides in pertinent part that "[alny official records of the
Department, including reports submitted in connection with the
administration of the Employment Security Act may be included in
the record.* Moreover, the appeal referee provided Ellison ample
opportunity to object to the admission of this material.
Ellison, however, made no objection and this issue cannot now be
raised for the first time on appeal. Barson v. E.R. Squibb &
Sons, I n c . 682 P.2d 832, 839 (Utah 1984).
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Our review of the record persuades us that Ellison received
a fair hearing. The appeal referee afforded Ellison the
opportunity to examine and cross-examine each witness and to
present its case. The appeal referee did not intimidate the
witnesses. Ellison, although he had a chance to do so, failed to
object to the appeal referee's questioning of the witnesses.
When one party is not represented by counsel, the appeal referee
has an affirmative duty to elicit all relevant facts, including
those favorable and unfavorable to the party that is not
represented,fififiVidal v. Harris. 637 F.2d 710, 713 (9th Cir.
1981). Finally, there is no indication the appeal referee
decided the case without considering evidence offered by
Ellison. This case certainly does not rise to the level of the
behavior condemned by the Utah Supreme Court in Bunnell v.
Industrial Comm'n, 740 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1987).
The decision of the Commission is affirmed.

Judith M. Billings, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

Michael R. Murphy, Judge
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or* to explain one's
76-6-312.

U.CJL 1961,

2. Criminal Lav 0*720(1). 1171J
Prosecutor's comment, in prosecution
lor jumping bail that defendant, when confronted by bondsman, gave no explanation
as to why be had jumped bail was not
error, in light of fact that prosecutor was'
simply commenting on one element necessary to prove offense, namely, absence
without good cause; in any event, any error was harmless, where defendant did not
attack evidence and did not assign insufficiency of evidence as error. U.CA. 1958,
76-S-312.
X. Criminal Law *»412.1(2)
Bondsman who confronted defendant
after defendant jumped bail had no duty to
administer Miranda warning. U.S.CA.
Const Amends 5, 14.

waa convicted hi the Third
District Conn. Safe Lake County, Ernest P.
, J-. of jumping bail, and he appealTW Ainu—i Court held that: (1)
i who confronted defendant after
i hail had no doty to adaad (2) prosegave no explanation
jumped bail waa not

a, ILCJt* m t I K-+4U»

Nancy Bergeson, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
David L» Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Earl P
Doriua, Roger S. Blaylock, Ted Cannon,
Aaet. Atty*. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from a jury conviction
for jumping bail * in the course of appellant's previous trial for five other felonies.
His bailfrA*^ffnynhad him returned from
Houston, Texas, about five months after
his prior conviction.
Appellant claims error in the summation
to the jury when the prosecutor spoke to
the bondsman's confrontation with appellant in Houston. Appellant argues that his
right to remain silent 1 was violated when
the prosecutor stated as follows:
When [appellant] was arrested he gave
no explanation as to what he was doing
there, at least that is what [his bondsman] told us, and there is no evidence
3* Under the fifth sad fourteenth

here today that suggests that he had any
legal justification for leaving.
[1,2] The statement appears to have
been little more than a paraphrasing of the
information that was filed or the advice
given by the trial judge to the jury as to
what the charge was against appellant
Jumping bail entails a concealment of
whereabouts or an evasion or failure to
explain one's absence. Referring to silence
and therefore implying failure to explain is
simply a comment on one of the elements
necessary to prove absence without good
cause or an explanation to justify it In
any event, appellant did not attack the evidence and did not assign insufficiency of
the evidence as error. Under the generally
accepted rule, any error such as that
claimed by appellant here is harmless.1

Utah
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error, but I do not find it to have been
prejudicial. The trial court promptly admonished the jury to disregard the comment, and he called their attention to his
instruction to them that they should draw
no adverse inference from the defendant's
failure to testify.
As to other matters discussed in the per
curiam opinion, 1 express no opinion since I
deem it unnecessary to do so.
DURHAM, J., concurs in the concurring
opinion of HOWE, J.
(o

fuVNUMMtlYltlM)

[3] There is nothing to indicate that appellant was coerced or pressured to explain
Sarah Ann ANDERSON, Plaintiff,
anything or that he claimed refuge by dev.
manding a Miranda warning. The conThe INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
frontation by the bondsman was that of a
UTAH, Department of Employment Secitizen under a legal contract to assure the
curity, Barco of Utah, State Insurance
presence of his promisor in court at the
Fund, and Second Injury Fund, Detime and place required. The cases cited
by appellant, principally Doyle v. Ohio, 426
fendants.
U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91
No, 19128.
(1976), are factually quite different Those
Supreme Court of Utah.
cases stand for the proposition that a public peace officer is charged with the duty to
Feb. 16, 1985.
arrest and the duty to administer the Miranda warning. In this case, the bondsOn review of worker's compensation
man had no such duty. The comment as to
appellant's silence in the presence of the order, the Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held
bondsman has no comparable connotation that claimant was denied due process by
as it did in the cases cited, particularly issuance of reaffirmance order by adminisbecause of the material, believable evidence trative law judge who was counsel for second injury fund when case was argued
pointing to guilt
We find no reversible error in the record. before judge who subsequently retired.
Reversed and remanded.
The verdict and sentence of the lower court
are affirmed.
HOWE, Justice (concurring in the result): 1. Constitutional Law *»301(4)
Worker's compensation applicant was
I concur in the result, but not in the
denied due process by issuance of order,
reasoning employed in the opinion of the
which reaffirmed retired judge's order, by
Court I place my concurrence on the
ground that the prosecutor's comment was administrative law judge who was formerly
s. The latest of our pronouncement! appears In
Suu * H»kmr, Utah. 610 r\2d 15 (1914).
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to the Industrial Commission for worker^
flnmnmsanon benefits, Barco's insuiir
the State Insurance Fund, settled with an!
After the operation, plaintiff § knee did
not heal and she missed several months of
•ork. A degenerative condiuon m her
knee caused it to deteriorate, necessitating
» o more operations. In 1980 she apphed
to the Industrial Commisston for additional
ownpfntshon. A medical panel found a
17-5% permanent partial physical impair,
•sent, which was caused partly by the n>
duatnal accident, and partly by a pre-ex*V
mg degenerative knee condition. Tbt panel further found that after the first knee
surgery, plaintiffs knee condition should
have stahihied in three months, and that'
any temporary total disability after three'
months was due to the pre-existing degen-1
eratjve knee condition Hie administrative
law judge, Judge Foley, adopted the meoV
cal panel'sfinding*,and ordered fPIT)[>fOSSr
Uon for thirteen weeks for temporary total
disability and found a 17.5% permanent^
partial disability.
TJ4
The plaintiff objected to the findings aVj
erroneous, and Judge Foley granted a fnr-J
User hearing as allowed by statute.^
U.CJL, 1^53, section 3d-l-«2£3 (Supp.1
1988). At the hearing, the plaintiff ao^
duced the testimony of her personal phya>]
esan. Dr. McQueen. We are unable to re-jj
view that testimony because the transenptj
of thai hearing has been lost The plamaffj
asserts that Dr McQueen testified that tbejj
medical panel set plaintiff s jwnnanent'paK
tad •npairmrnt rating too low and tmpropj
eriy baaed *s finding of the tune required
for ttahfltranon on normal recovery ratssv
Section &-1-&L& provides that when'ajjj
case is reopened and a further hearmfl
head, the administrative law judge will earj
ter a supplemental order. However, s i W J
the second hearing Judge Foley neitherj
reaffirmed nor modified his previous fiaM
sags and order, nor did he enter a supploJ
order, although counsel for plaint*** ]
reqaeated haw to do so.

Judge Foley retired in July or August,
1982, and was succeeded by Mr Timothy
Allen, who had been counsel for the Second
Injury Fund when this case was argued
before Judge Foley. In January, 1983,
Judge Allen issued an order reaffirming
the previous order and dismissing plaintiffs objections to the court's findings
Plaintiff sought review by the Industrial
Commission, which declined to hear the
matter.
We need not consider all plaintiffs arguments on appeal, since one is dispositive.
[1-3] It was error lor Judge Allen to
preside in this case, since he was formerly
an attorney for one of the parties. One of
the fundamental principles of due process
is that all parties to s case are entitled to
an unbiased, impartial judge. "A fair trial
in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of
due process/' In re Murchison, 849 U.S.
188, 186, 75 S.Ct 623, 625, 99 L.Ed.2d 942
(1955). Fairness requires not only an absence of actual bias, but endeavors to prevent even the possibility of unfairness.
[4,5] This principle applies with as
much force to administrative proceedings
as it does to judicial trials. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579, 93 S.Ct 1689,
1698, 86 L.£d.2d 488 (1973), Valx Convalescent & Care Institution v. Industrial
Commission, Utah, 649 P.2d 83, 87 (1982).
Utah law requires a trial judge to disqualify himself if he has previously appeared as
an attorney in the case. U.C.A., 1953, section 78-7-1(3). Although this statute does
not literally apply to administrative proceedings, the principle it embodies is a use*
ful and persuasive guide in reviewing administrative proceedings. See 8 K. Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise section 196
(2d ed. 1980).
In Amos Treat & Co. v. Securities and
Exchange Commission, 806 P.2d 260 (D.C.
Cir.1962), the court held that an SEC commissioner should not have participated in
revocation proceedings, since he formerly
had been responsible for initiating and conducting the investigation of the company
subject to revocation. The court stated:

"The fundamental requirements of fairness in the performance of [quasi-judicial]
functions require at least that one who
participates in a case on behalf of any
party .. take no part in the decision of
that case by any tribunal on which he may
thereafter sit' " Id. at 264 (quoting Trans
World Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics
Board, 254 F.2d 90, 91 (D.C.Cir.1958)).
[6] In other words, when a judge has
previously been involved in a case as an
attorney, there is no need to show actual
prejudice. The law presumes prejudice in
such circumstances. Judge Allen should
have disqualified himself in this case.
The defendants acknowledge that Judge
Allen should not have acted in this case,
but argue that the error was harmless because it did not affect the outcome in the
case. Specifically, they argue that Judge
Allen's written order merely memorialises
what Judge Foley had already decided at
the close of the second hearing. They assert that Judge Foley ruled from the bench
that the plaintiffs objections were dismissed and that the medical panel's findings would not be modified.
The record does not support the defendants' factual assertions. As noted earlier,
the transcript of the second heanng was
lost, and hence the record does not reflect
what Judge Foley said at the close of the
second hearing. Although Judge Allen's
order states that "it appears from the file
that [plaintiffs] counsel was advised . . . at
the termination of the heanng" that his
objections were dismissed, we find nothing
in the record to support this statement
We therefore set aside the Commission's
order and remand this case for submission
of the issue to another administrative law
judge.
Reversed and remanded.
HALL, CJ., and DURHAM, HOWE and
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
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Brighton Bank to purchaae the itock for
$30 par share, and an October 5,1981 offer
from ono Mike Crowley to purchaae tho
same for $40 par share. Appellant eontends that tho arbitrators choae to ignore
tho offer of $40 par aharo made by Crow-

ro
o
CM

fcy.
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IT)
X
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that the
tthe
by on* Naal South
aa attorney, a party, or a
by a party, contrary la
of Utah Coot Ann. ft 78a V t O t n V Theleased,rcfiectathaipnor
C snpaHsnr lodged
Ssatffc's pertxspeoon at a
t of the mat, bat that ha did
aw Urn aa awafCnaat renew, namely, that
Sevan v i a aot a trastee. Since seesaw
1 M H awes a t rsqojre lemoaaiiiation by
t% objection had no vara daim that
i earned m aalfafiod by tho
m tho hennas; van aot pjoatmind to nor
hanaf boon fasted far tho lint tan* on
it fertW *

(5) Generally, the court* are without
authority to review the action of arbitrators to correct error* or to substitute their
conclusions for those of the arbitrators act»
ing honestly and within the scope of their
authority.* Only under statutorily designated grounds may a court vacate or set
aside an arbitration award.1
(€] In this ease, appellant asserts as the
statutory grounds necessary to vacate the
award that the arbitrators ignored the
facts, msMpphfiri the law, and grossly violated the concepts of equity and fairness.
However, the record does not bear out the
sisertion. There is nothing to indicate that
the arbitrators did not duly consider the
evidence of Crowley's offer of $40 per
share. Similarly, there is nothing to indicate that the arbitrators did not also consider the fact that the offer was made after
the date fixed for valuation and, more importantly, that the offer did not culminate
in a sale. When weighed against all of the
other evidence regarding value, the arbitrators' determmsnon of market value appears to be fan* and reasonable, and we do
not disturb A by substituting our judgment
for that of the arbitrators.1
17] Appellant's neat point on appeal is
that the arbitration award was not timely,
his contention being that the award was
not made withm sixty days from the tune
of the appointment of the arbitrators aa
aundated by Utah Code Ann. § 78-31-8
(1977). We do not address the merits of
this contention because having permitted
the prnreedingi to go forward to conelu*
sun wtthout lodging a protest, appellant is

m lanh 4*2. see. i s e> Jet

in the amount of 16.67 per day thereafter.
Affirmed. Costs to petitioner.

deemed to have waived any objection of
timeliness.*

Appellant's remaining point on appeal is
that the order confirming the Award is not
STEWART, Associate CJL, and
supported by the record. He asserts that
the record contains only an unsigned copy HOWE, DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN,
of the arbitration agreement, that the JJ., concur.
award is impeachable on its face because it
is undated and makes no reference to the
(o iuYMtMMIiVSTtM)
dates the arbitrators were appointed, and
that the award contains no language purporting to make an award.
Utah Code Ann. ft 78-81-20 (1977) required in part that the person moving for
an order confirming an award file with the
clerk the written arbitration agreement or
a verified copy thereof, and the award nv
self. The purpose of the statute was to
provide a method by which an award could
be reduced to judgment by summary proceedings.1*

Irwin G. BUNNELL, Plaintiff;
•.

The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION O
UTAH, United States Steel Corp*
ration/Geneva, and the Second Injur
Fund, Defendants.

[8] In the absence of a factual dispute
that a written arbitration agreement was
entered into, that arbitration proceedings
were had, and that an sward was made
without complaint until it was clear that
appellant had lost,11 the trial court appropriately concluded that the irregularities
and informalities complained of did not constitute grounds tor vacating the award
within the contemplation of Utah Code
Ann. ftft 7S-31-16 and -17 (1077).

No. 860196.
Supreme Court of Utah.
July 28, 1987.
Claimant was denied total disabih
benefits after hearing before an admini
trative judge law whose decision was u
held by the Industrial Commission. Clau
ant appealed. The Supreme Court, Di
ham, J., held that (1) exclusion of testae
ny concerning physician's statements <
the basis of hearsay was improper, and i
due process was denied where administi
tive law judge's conduct was not imparts

[0] In regard to the remaining contention that the language contained in the
award does not purport to make an award,
Reversed and remanded.
we disagree. Although designated as
Zimmerman, J., dissented and ffi
"Conclusions," the paragraphs contained opinion in which Hall, CJ., concurred.
therein plainly constitute the award made
by the arbitration panel Particularly explicit is paragraph 5 thereof which reads sa I. Constitutional Law *»318U)
follows:
Due process demands new trial wl
6. James D. Fake owes the Plan the the appearance of unfairness is so pi
sum of $17,230.48 including accrued in- that reasonable person would find the h<
terest to June 15,1088. Interest accrues ing unfair. U.S.C.A. ConsUAmends. 5,
ft, Mk Apmrtmmu v. Martinet. 434 ?2d 704, 70* 1*. St Ommofuht, 10 Utah 442 at 449,131
(Colo.CuApp.1982); R.R Bmn Comtr. Co. v.

set ffM m 447.

Utah 1331

U l l (Utah USD

Mkldktmy

AM$OG$H 139 Vt 200, 421 A2d

at 356.

306,

311-12 (I960); $m eav Utah Code Aaa. I 7e31a-10 (1917).
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erection erf archee to support a roof over
es* of tfce open aeerta furnaces. Anarch
earned by a crane struck plaintiff and he
lost km footing on the catwalk. Fkunuff
fefi about fifteen feet to the floor of the
pad kit furnace, where he lay until co-worker* reached nun thirty to fifty seconds in*
Usr. Be was taken to the Geneva riitrtmea
ry and then to a hospital where he regained
coasoooeneas five days later Plaintiffs
gsjarsaj were grievous, he fractured his
left wnst and several fingers on that hand,
fractured hit ngnt *** fractured five ni*
on has rujnt aide, auffereo a oppressed skull
fracture, and was buna&d. In 1&55, puunoff received an award of S36&25, wiuch
repreeenteB a lo percent permanent partial
dssabuiry ^Plaintiff, who was fifty at the
pent of the amrtrni, eventually returned to
eajsasMgrswsse't
M 'wmf^mwm iimetnlr^J

CM* M 746 tld

{1} It is IT >
nere have been cases
ID which *• • * &» ha# jwesented more
©pmpeliix^ *t*u* M^aeevej every person who wrings & --^' *o s court or at a
hearing held btfo-t an administrative agency has a due process right to receive a fair
tn* n ~Qvi of a fair tribunal Anderson
v. yjw
*
mmususn, 696 PJ2d 1219,
1221 (Utah iaSfc). "Fairness requires not
only an absence of actual bus, but endeavors to prevent even the possibility of unfairness." M at xtmx
in reviewing the
Commission's r
on i&ruftutuuonai
challenge**, this
*P*>bes * correction*
oi-erroi etanlam *«h no deference to the
Commission's expertise
Vt&h Department of Administrative Service* * }*v Service Commission, 668 P.2d #o
(Utah 1988). Our review of th# -
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it] Plaintiff attempted to offer th*
statements of treating physicians (now unavailable ss witnesses) concerning the damage caused by the accident, but the adm&istrative law judge rejected the statements
m hearsay. There was no- reason for the
rejection of the statements on that basis'.
Utah Code Ann § 8o-l-S8 (1974) reads:
"Neither the commission nor its hearing
officers shall be bound by the usual common-law or statutory rules of evidence."
See also Utah EJhnd. 1101 (Rules of Evident 4^*/ to all actions ana proceedings
in c
with certain enumerated exception*.
* * have repeatedly held that the
near»»v mie aoes not apply in aomuustrative hearings See, «.#, Schmidt v Industrial Commission, 61? P Zd e»Z, 006 (i ts*
iftft), Gardnm % Edward Quran*

801

••wsyiaiT li
> ^tssties- w&m*
he * e 4 awvwr f ^ r t
*/ x^t
^ ^ M « e oaei +m*m*4 «**t 't
r» smm Jar total deei a&* jsinun erf hwr by the sm»

R'S cawcessaew* wees a«sr~

by paaaajft We agree,
ratemdeaw; wefeweraeaad
atV
tsilttl
i as g caraeaaer by Gswsm

After i>>^ nrrerfceiiir. r^rirrff had to drast>
ceJry redncb his physical activities and suffared frequently from prieomonis for which
he was hofccetakuMi severe tunes. Puuntsff reeesvwd treauaeat for lung atknenta
ftesa 10i8»to the present. He preesated
t erf several tentative diagnoses, n>
* epdeney and ennhyaeesa, that..had
been saade ever the yean. All of these
were rejected after further ex*
and treaooent Pkinttff asto
eabwufiad a statement by a doctor speaalmag m poknrwintry medjaae, who examined
de*offMlS6^siida«clud^«uahesufobatrurtive pofenonary
a w ^ t for WBM^ there was a»ckarpreca>
aattag eaaae. The n i t era set said that the
r boJarvad tfee accident; was a cojuriboa pkstdxff«

w&mm

phuntiirs Witnesses were inhibited and intimidated by the Judge's conduct, and felt
defensive and hesitant to testify, the judge
interfered with puunuffs counsel'! ability
to make a record and argue the evidence,
and the judge gave tne jtopearance of having decided tue case without even considering the medical records. The dissent minimixes this behavior as "Impatience" and a
lack of "temperate neutrality/' We think
the record reflects a far more serious systematic failure to conduct a fair hearing.
L Th^diMcni dcrkka thii pnnc^U *» * "general
hortatory Mstcmmf and say* mat Andtr$<m It
not helpful in the resolution of thit caas. We
disagree. We do not think mat due process
requires procedures dial endeavor to »v<
t m unfainies* only in caeet"
the Judajr aiao acted as counsel for c
parte /*** «uuaUoo in **d$n<m),
dHak thai eue |eoceas eetnanda a ^
of unfaimest a m plm£i

tumum ujr pnyaiuajs ueatmg ner busoandL
We have examinee the medical records
available to tne administrative law ptdg9
and think it unfair to the p^in* of error for
the judge t£ have rejected hearsay supplementation of those records Man) of toe
records concerning the 196? *ccidea remained in the control of Ge«ieva Steel. The
records are self<ontrajductory - ^f obvious*
)y incomplete For examp'- ^e m$&~£>
record summary prepared b> *
*.
va'fi doctors for considersUo?
trial panel m 1955 placed the b
that we are left with the abiding uiap A**.^ %hm
a reaaonahk person would find Htm h®*mt$*
unfair It is perhaps instructive tha*
~
ifirauve law judge whose condur
Uon in Andsrum was also the }u#
We fear die masoning employee
will encourage the< lmpr«»»ior
u•iona are merely %Mi*iory~ -?
mi be
enforced.
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w *ACOK mm&ttM. u axxasa
tiffs wilt frequenter incorporated in her
mpnmM statements like "I don't know
whether this would he allowed k the
record or not," *?a>a I oat of tine," and
tt^tafa hod for the record, but ifa the
troth." Further, the witness eeome to
have reenuied her totthnony to matters
that ahe thought the ednimistratrre law
jodge would find acceptahle after ahe had
heem told hy her counsel that ahe could not
tall what a treating physician had said.
Toe arimmistrative law judge was also
iniokaaiit of counsel's argument on behalf
ofphuotiff. He refused to hates to dosing
argument. More shockingly, when plaintiffs osuossl offered argument messing
toe evidence before the admission of the
modirsl records on which the adminietratwe law judge purportedly made his decision, the adnumstrathre law judge told
plaintiffs counsel to save the argument tar
rehearing, mdrafing that he had already
dadoed to hold against plaintiff without
even cramming the medical records.
In abort, the adminietratnre Isw judge's
conduct so far diverged from that which
would be caponed from an impartial judge
that we agree with plaintiff that his right
to due protect was violated.

STEWART, Associate CJ., and
HOWE, J„ concur.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice (dissenting):
I agree with the majority that the administrative law judge plainly erred in excluding evidence in reliance on the hearsay
rule. We have held explicitly that a strict
•ppbrstinrt of the rules of evidence it inappropriate in such has ringi. Eg*, Gardner
a Edward Gardner Plumbing 4b Heating,
i n c . 4*8 PJd 678, 681-82 (Utah 19841. 1
also think the testimony excluded was ralevent to tan wanes put before htm. Howover, I cannot conclude that the erroneous
STrmsiea of the evidence was harmful.
Thaw was ample evidence before the edswnistrativc lew judge to support his ruling
that plaintiff hod failed to show a causal
mnasrtinn between the accident and the
hw*prohlae*s. 5a* «*t,Hi&ins% Jndur

BUNNELL v. INDUSTRIAL COM*N OP UTAH
O U M M S fid
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trial Commission, 700 P.2d 704, 706 (Utah
1985); Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet
Management, 725 P.2d 1828 (Utah 1986).
It is not for this Court to redetermine the
weight of the evidence and the credibility
of the witnesses. E.g., Stoker v. Industrial Commission, 61 Utah 11, 16, 209 P. 880,
882 (1922). Given the decision of the administrative law judge on the conflicting
evidence, 1 cannot ssy that had the erroneously excluded evidence been admitted, it
would have raised s substantial likelihood
of an outcome more favorable to the claimant MatHngly v. Charnes, 700 P.2d 927,
929 (Colo.App.1985) (administrative agency's decision will not be reversed unless
substantial rights of the party are prejudiced); In re Certificate of Need Application, 284 Kan. 802, 805-06, 676 P.2d 107,
110 (1984) (administrative agency's error
which does not prejudice substantial rights
of the party will not be reversed); see also
Gardner v. Edward Gardner Plumbing &
Heating, Inc., 698 P.2d at 682 (administrative law judge's exclusion of testimony justified remand when the judge effectively
precluded plaintiff from meeting the evidence against him); cf. State v. Hackford,
66 Utah Adv.Rep. 9,11 n. 1 (April 22,1987);
see State v. Knight, 784 P.2d 918, 919-21
(Utah 1987) (standard of review defined);
Utah R.Evid. 108; Utah R.Civ.P. 61; Utah
R.Cnm.P. 80; Utah Code Ann. ft 77-85-80
(1982). Therefore, I would affirm on the
causation issue.1
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In the present action, the administrative
law judge did more than rule erroneously.
He also displayed impatience with the
claimant's witnesses and did not manifest
the temperate neutrality that I would hope
is the general rule in trial oourta and administrative tribunals. However, I cannot
agree that his divergence from good practice was so extreme or affected the proceedings, so profoundly that we can say
that the claimant was denied due process
under the state constitution.
The majority cites Anderson v. Industrial Commission, 696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah
1985), as authority for the proposition that
"[f)airness requires not only an absence of
actual bias, but endeavors to prevent even
the possibility of unfairness." This genersl hortatory statement is correct How*
ever, it does not assist in deciding the
present case. In Anderson, we held that
principles of fairness required that an administrative law judge be disqualified from
a case when he or she previously had appeared as an attorney for one side. The
statute we applied in reaching this conclusion does not require any showing of actual
prejudice, but mandates automatic disqualification when a judge has acted as an attorney for either party in the action. Utah
Code Ann. ft 78-7-1(8) (1977). We aaw no
reason why this statutory requirement
should not be extended under the banner of
due process to administrative law judges.

Thst ruling has no application in the
As for the majority's holding that the
proceedings before the administrative lsw present action. Moreover, there is no state
judge were conducted in a manner that statute, rule, or provision of the Code of
made them so unfair as to deny the claim- Judicial Conduct that condemns what ocant due process of lsw under article I, curred here. The closest provision is that
section 7 of the Utah Constitution, I dis- which requires that judges must disqualify
sent Certainly, the administrative law themselves when they are actually biased
judge erred in excluding the hearsay evi- or prejudiced against a party or an attordence. To my knowledge, erroneous rul- ney. See Utah R.Civ.P. 68(b). Due proings slone are not sufficient to show the cess most certainly requires that a similar
bias or prejudice required to disqualify s rule apply in an administrative setting.
judge. State ex rel Miller v. Richardson, See, e.g., Vali Convalescent & Care Insti229 Kan. 284, 288, 628 P.2d 1817, 1822 tution v. Industrial Commission, 649
(1981) (construing state statutory lsw); see P.2d 88, 86-87 (Utah 1982). However, the
Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 8, ft C. present fscts do not rise to that leveL
i. Apparently tht majority asTest thst tht tvi*
deatiery ruling alone does not warrant reversal,
i it reaches for tht eoasutuuooal argument

at s foundation for overturning the result below.

1 2 M Dot
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fee soi act Pom? R. Fishier, J„ summarily dismissed
ta toe m> parent's claim. The Supreme Court, Hall,
k n o a o l Sm Cost CJ., held that action was barred by four*
S, ft A & His year statute of repose.
eete^pmydmqaalnV
Affirmed.
or ossy ta« ckssmot
Sm Stmts WLLogmm.ZK KM*.
•a* P.M T7s\ 784 os (Meek ijaBetotieo of artinot e ^ ( ( l )
damage resulting from surgery performed
s e t years earner was barred by four-year
me smajtaj semi Id be rs Minos statute of repose, even though alleged negpeosds toat aie seed today to thence was discovered mas than two years
tarn m^sesedssg m the asset of ^fat „& w a i Q^ U.CJL1^63, 78-14teeeme a smaoai* attack upon ^
ntaSi

^SMiMjsyiimtsfiiiei
ssm steal em OBJ gwee OBJ.
HAIJ CJ, «—— m the
i a* IlMnfEBMAM. J.

Q^ ^ B i c h m i J ^ ^ L ^ Q^ f o r
okmtiff sod appellant.
*• Anthony Eyre, Salt Lake City, for
orfsodsot and reepoodent.
HAIJ, Chief Justice:

of dismissal of his claim for n^MJHtti malpractice. The only viable issue on appeal is
whether the trial court correctly concluded
that plaintiffs claim was barred by the
four-year statute of repose contained in
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14*4 (1987).1
la May 1S7S, defendant performed corrective surgery on plaintiffs ankle necessitated by an injury sustained in an automobueaccme&L On February 19,1982, plaintiff alkgedly dmootered that the surgery
hod been negligently performed and comlis lawsuit with the filing of a
so December 28, 1S82.
On appeal, plaintiff advances the same
protected to the trial court He
his complaint was timely
filed withm two yean of the date his injury
Tot was docori red, and m reliance upon our
m Foil a BalUnger* he contends
aedraei ibcm. £ g , Tepik v. Tkurber.
J* TM 1101. 1101 (Utah 19S7); Jwfcy Mfg.
Cm*, K Dmpm Bmtk * Tnm. 717 tM 1341,
U47(Uebltte>.
2. eftl fJd 144 (Utah ItTi).

MADDOCKS v. SALT LAKE CITY CORP.
C1UM74S HA 1117 (Uuk I9S7)

that his claim should not have been extinguished before it was discovered.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1987) (effective April 1, 1976) provides, in pertinent
part*
(1) No malpractice action against a
health care provider may be brought unless it is commenced within two years
after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or
through the use of reasonable diligence
should have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four
yean after the date of the alleged act,
omission, neglect or occurrence
(2) The provisions of this section shall
apply to all persons, regardless of ...
legal disability under ft 78-12-86 or any
other provision of the law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associations and corporations and
to all health care providers and to all
malpractice actions against health care
providers based upon alleged personal
injuries which occurred prior to the effective date of this act; provided, however,
that any action which under former law
could have been commenced after the
effective date of this act may be commenced only within the unelapsed portion
of time allowed under former law; but
any action which under former law could
have been commenced more than four
years after the effective date of this act
may be commenced only within four
yean after the effective date of this act
(Emphasis added.)
The trial court appropriately observed
that the foregoing statute is stated in two
parts. It is not only a statute of limitation;
it is also a statute of repose. The statute
begins to run from the time an injured
person knows or should know that he has
suffered an injury.1 But in any event, the
statute requires that an action be commenced within four years after the date of
the incident which caused the injury.
Plaintiffs reliance upon Foil is misplaced. In that case, the cause of action
was commenced within the four-year stati. Id. at 14S0.
740PJO-*)

Utah 1337

ute of repose, and the Court was not called
upon to address the issue raised in this
case.
Plaintiffs cause of action is barred by
the four-year statute of repose. The summary judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
STEWART, Associate CJ., and
HOWE, DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN,
JJ., concur.
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Preston MADDOCKS, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, et
al., Defendants and Respondents.
No. 19916.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 6, 1987.
Arrestee brought civil rights and negligence action against city and throe police
officers seeking to recover damages for
injuries sustained when he was allegedly
wrongfully arrested and unlawfully beaten
by one officer. The Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, David B. Dee, J., granted summary judgment to defendants, and
appeal was taken. The Supreme Court,
Durham, J., held that (1) deprivation of
civil rights action was governed by four*
year statute of limitations for persona] injuries, not by two-year statute of limitations for actions brought against sheriffs
and officers for liability incurred through
omission of official duty; (2) arrestee's action against police officers for negligence
in failing to intervene in beating by third
police officer was barred by statute precluding persona] liability of government
employee for acts or omissions occurring
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PROCEEDINGS
BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: This 1$ a hearing 1n the matter of
Ellison, Inc. employer no. 4-128112-0 on October 6, 1986 at 10:10 a.m.
The hearing 1s being held 1n the Salt Lake Job Service Office by
Kenneth Major, Administrative Law Judge,
The employer filed an appeal on May 23, 1986 to the audit determination
dated May 23, 1986.
Appearances are made by Field Auditor Drew Christensen with the Department
Dave Ell 1 son for the employer and Dexter Anderson, attorney 1s representing
the employer. Witnesses have been arranged to testify phone and they are
Don Bennett, Paul Bowles, Roger Chappel and K1rk Wilcox.
At Issue 1n this hearing 1s to determine whether Individual Included 1n the
auditors audit performed the services for a wage constituting employment
under the provisions of the Utah Employment Security Act.
Do both parties understand the Issue? (Answers 1n the affirmative)
IE

Alright. I have here some documents which I would H k e to briefly review
and entervlnto the record. They will be entered into the record subject
to comment or exception that will come forth during the testimony.
Exhibit #1 is in two parts labeled la and lb. This is a status determination
issued by Mr. Christensen, May 23, 1986, giving the basis for his audit
determination which held various individuals in employment. This is unsigned,
is this in fact your determination Mr. Christensen?

ISTENSEN
GE

Yes.
E x h i b i t #2 i s a Notice of Appeal, f i l e d by the employer May 2 3 , 1986, appealing

the Department's decision.
is that your signature?

This is signed by David L. Ellison.

Mr. Ellison

.ISON

Yes.

)GE

Exhibit #3 is a Schedule of Unreported Wages. This gives a list of the individuals performing services and the amounts the auditor determined to be wages.
This breaks it down per quarter for 1984 and 1985. Is that your signature on
that document Mr. Christensen?

RISTENSEN

Yes

DGE

Exhibit #4 is in two parts labeled 4a and 4b. This is the auditor's audit
report listing the results of his findings showing total contributions owing
in the amount $7,040.20, covering the years 1984 and 1985, plus additional
interest and penalties. The reverse side is audit information concerning the
records audited and the reasons for the differences. Is this your signature
there Mr. Christensen?

IRISTENSEN

Yes.

JUDGE

Exhibit #5 1s fevtral sheets labeled SA through 5F. These are the auditor's
worksheets for each one of the years audited. Exhibit #6 1s the Status
Reported completed by the Department - this 1s per status letter. Is that
your Initials there Mr. Chrlstensen?

CHRISTENSEN

Yes.

JUDGE

Exhibit

ANDERSON

Excuse me, can I look at that?

JUDGE

Exhibit #7 1s a wage schedule. A break down of payments for various trips
which the drivers might take for Ellison and also a breakdown for a particular
service that may be performed by the drivers. Mr. Chrlstensen* can you tell
me what Exhibit 8 through 8d might be?

CHRISTENSEN

These were given to me before I ever contacted Mr. Ellison. They are from
the Motor Vehicle Department, listing of registrations of various vehicles
listed either Mr. Ellison or Ellison, Inc.

JUDGE

They are labeled 8a through 8d. Exhibit #9 1s in three parts labeled 9a throu
9c, this is the Independent Contractor Agreement. It does not have any
particular contractor's name on it, however it bears the signature of David
Ellison. I assume this is a sample contract that is used?

ELLISON

That was filled out, these auditors took the names offwith liquid paper.

CHRISTENSEN

I wiped out the names so -

JUDGE

Alright, this is a sample contract -

ELLISON

No it's a legitimate contract.

JUDGE

Is that your signature on that document?

ELLISON

Yes.

JUDGE

Exhibit #10a and 10b is a subpoena issued to David Ellison as President of
Ellison, Inc. and 10b is Return of Service that this subpoena was served to
Mr. Ellison. Exhibit 11 is two parts 11a and lib. This is a statement by
claimant of work and wages filed by Donald K. Bennett, a driver who had
contracted with Ellison, lib is a list of payments he received.
I will receive those into the record, 1 through lib, subject to comment or
exception. Before we proceed further gentlemen, do any of you need to take a
few moments to further look over these documents?

ANDERSON

...FOR JUST A MINUTE

JUDGE

Alright. Also did the employer and employer representative receive a brochun
entitled "Unemployment Insurance Appeals Information"?

ANDERSON

I am sorry would you repeat that?

nnAr>
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E

Did you receive a small leaflet explaining the appeal hearing and your
appeal rights?

:RS0N

I haven't seen that.

[SON

I don't recall having...

5E

That 1s generally sent out, you should have receive that with your notice.
In the event that 1t was not received, let me mention a couple of Items that
are Important for you to understand. This will be the only hearing which any
evidence or testimony may be submitted. Should either party, the Department
or yourself, desire to appeal the decision that will be rendered as a result
of this hearing, that appeal would be made to The Board of Review. There is
also a level of appeal from The Board of Review, The Supreme Court. The
reason why this 1s the only hearing 1s that The Board of Review and The Supreme
Court do not hold hearings as we are, they are looking at a transcript of this
recording, in addition to any evidence that 1s entered Into the record as exhibits and from those sources they would issue their decision. Is that understood by both parties?

ERSON

Yes.

iGE

Okay. Counsel, I will give you a few more moments to look over those documents
and we will get under way. While you are doing that I will get ahold of the
well, we will get into Mr. Christensen's testimony before we get into the other
witnesses.

)ERS0N

I think we are ready.

)6E

Alright. OATH GIVEN TO MR. CHRISTENSEN. Answered in the affirmative.
Please state your name and position with the Department?

USTENSEN

Name is Drew Christensen, I am a Field Auditor with Job Service.

)GE

Thank you Mr. Christensen. Would you begin by explaining the basis of your
investigation into Ellison.

RISTENSEN.

I was given an assignment to contact Mr. Ellison on possible employment that
was not being reported. The source, I was told, was an anonymous tip. I
contacted Mr. Ellison. He then said that to see the records I would have
to subpoena him because he was not really happy with the concept of me doing
an audit on the records. So I got a subpoena and I went through the records
at that time.

DGE

What records did you audit?

IRISTENSEN

He brought in, basically, work sheets that show the amounts paid, the trips
that each of the individuals made and that was broke down by quarters.

IDGE

Continue.

IRISTENSEN

Those were the main records that he brought in. There were (?) checks
that did cover the whole time period, but there were some checks that were
hmnnht in that were mainly the worksheets of the individuals.

JUDGE

Did you have iccesi to my check register or Journelt, ledgers?

CHRISTENSEN

No, there really was not a register or check stubs or such.

JUDGE

It was primarily from the worksheets?

CHRISTENSEN

Right.

JUDGE

What type of services did you find being performed?

CHRISTENSEN

The Individuals were taking a truck, mainly from the Fillmore area, I
understand, not always, but from a farm area, hauling hay and I think 1t was
to the area around Haywood, California. I am not positive on that. Dellveri
the hay down there and then, 1n most cases, back hauling something from the
L.A. area to Salt Lake or someplace 1n Utah or maybe even Nevada.

JUDGE

How were these drivers being paid?

CHRISTENSEN

They were paid by a schedule - a certain amount for whereever the trip was
from to where 1t was they were to drop off the load.

JUDGE

How did you obtain that information?

CHRISTENSEN

From this sheet.

JUDGE

Who furnished you the sheet?

CHRISTENSEN

Mr. Ellison.

JUDGE

What elements of control did you find, Mr. Christensen?

CHRISTENSEN

Basically the element of control was the ownership of the trucks.

JUDGE

Do you want to expound upon that?

CHRISTENSEN

The trucks belonged to either Mr. Ellison or Ellison, Inc.

JUDGE

...Why does that exhibit control?

CHRISTENSEN

Basically from Exhibit 8 a,b,c and d - who the trucks belonged to.

JUDGE

Why did you determine that exhibited control?

CHRISTENSEN

Because the ownership of the truck, who owns that, is the one who has control.

JUDGE

Any other indicators of control?

CHRISTENSEN

None, just the..

JUDGE

Did youmakean investigation to determine whether any of these individuals
were independently established?

CHRISTENSEN

I sent out Form II to each of them, none of them were returned.

JUDGE

What is a Form II?
A/>
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ISTENSEN

It 1s I questionnaire that was mailed out asking the Individuals their
concept, whether they were an employee or an Independent.

GE

None of these were returned?

IISTENSEN

I think 1t was eight of them.

IGE

Who did you send them to?

tISTENSEN

I have the names here - Dan Camer, Mike Stevens, Max Bishop, Dave Johnson,
Don Bennett, Paul Bole, I am not sure 1f that 1s pronounced right, Roger
Chappel, Keith Hazelton and Ralph Taylor.

)GE

Did you have occasion to talk with any of these drivers?

tISTENSEN

No, none of them. I talked to two of their wives.
them by phone.

)GE

What information did you learn from the wives?

RISTENSEN

The wives were not able to furnish me with any information.
sure what the relationship was with the business.

DGE

I refer you to what has been labeled exhibit #9, Mr. Christensen. This is
the Independent Contractor Agreement. Are you familiar with this document?

RISTENSEN

I have read through it once, is all.

DGE

Did you find in the records such documents being signed by the drivers?

RISTENSEN

There were three separate copies - I can't remember which names were on
them. We made a copy of the one and then whited out the name.

DGE

So you did see three such documents that driver's signatures?

RISTENSEN

Um-hum. I can't tell you which ones they were now.

DGE

On reviewing that document, Mr. Christensen, what is your opinion of that
document?

IRISTENSEN

Well, I think that it is set up to set them up as an independent contractor,
but I don't think it really applies because the individuals don't own the
trucks and thus do not have a business of their own.

IDGE

Why is the ownership of the truck important?

IRISTENSEN

It shows control.

JDGE

Anything else concerning this contract here.

«ISTENSEN

No.

JDGE

The individuals you include here on your audit, were all those drivers?

unTCTCMCCM

Ac T imHorctanH. thev were all drivers. The worksheets indicate that they

How many did you send out?

I tried to contact

They were not

JUDGE

Anything further, Mr. ChHitenten?
you would like to ask?

Counsellor, do you have tome questions

ANDERSON

Yes. Mr. Chrlstensen, I don't want to get started off on the wrong foot, but
think that you remember that we did have some conversation about the posslbll
that one of Dave's competitors may have Instigated the Investigation. You
mentioned that you had been given the assignment - could you elaborate on
that as to who gave you the assignment and

CHRISTENSEN

The assignment was assigned by my Immediate supervisor, Don Avery.

ANDERSON

What was his name?

CHRISTENSEN

Don Avery.

ANDERSON

Would you have any Information as to how he came to be Interested 1n
Ellison, Inc.?

CHRISTENSEN

From what he told me, he had received the assignment from his supervisor
Dean Kimber who had been told that there was an anonymous tip.

ANDERSON

Who was his supervisor, then?

CHRISTENSEN

Dean Kimber.

ANDERSON

Would you have any idea who that anonymous tipper was?

CHRISTENSEN

I have no idea.

ANDERSON

Based on your knowledge of the procedures in the office, would there be any
record of that? You are calling i t an anonymous tipper, I don't know, I am
just trying to find out would there be any record of that telephone call?

CHRISTENSEN

I am not aware of i t .

ANDERSON

Are you aware of any procedures that might disclose the name of that person?

CHRISTENSEN

No I am not. Alot of times they will just call and refuse to give their
name.

ANDERSON

Are you aware of any way the name of that person might be revealed?

CHRISTENSEN

I am not aware of any.

ANDERSON

If this a fairly common thing to happen in the Department, to act on
anonymous tips?

CHRISTENSEN

Yes, I get about three a year where someone will call my line and I ask
them for a name and they say no - I write down the information and turn it
over to my supervisor and let him decide whether it should be acted upon
and in most cases it is.

ANDERSON

You did not take this call?

ANDERSON

Do you know who did?
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ISTENSEN

No I don't.

:RS0N

Would there be any record of that?

ISTENSEN

Unless Mr. Mmbtr has 1tt I don't know.

ERSON

Okay, lets move on. Did you, 1n your Investigation, find any regular route
that any of these individuals classified as drivers, followed on a routine
basis?

ISTENSEN

My understanding was that there were various routes, so there was no set -

ERSON

A regular route like a UPS delivery man might follow, a certain map or road
every day and stop at certain places?

ISTENSEN

There was no Indication of this kind of a route. When you look at the
schedule of how much they are paid from one point to another, that was what
they were paid and apparently they would go the shortest route to save time
and whatever. There was not a set route that they had to go as I understand.
They had to go from point A to

ERSON

...Depending on where they picked up and where they delivered was

lISTENSEN

They would just go the shortest route, as far as I know.

»ERS0N

Did you find any schedules, I will use that word, any schedules that any
driver or each driver had to follow?

[ISTENSEN

Do you mean time schedule?

)ERS0N

Yes.

USTENSEN

No, there was not a set time on when the trips went.
even on days.

JERSON

Were there any hourly records kept. In other words, the number of hours a
person might have been required to drive, or anything of that nature?

USTENSEN

I did not see anything as far as required hours, to drive.
made the trip from point A to point B.

3ERS0N

Did you find any kind of a work schedule. When any particular individual
was required to report to work or when his time off was.

RISTENSEN

No, there was no schedule of that kind.

DERSON

The pay that each driver received then, was strictly based on the - exhibit
#7, wage schedule -but the schedule just simply show how much a person was
paid to take a truck from point A to point B.

RISTENSEN

That's the way they were paid.

DERSON

Was there any indication that any of all of these drivers worked on a full
time basis, what we would consider a full time basis? Were any of them parttime or irregular?

They were random,

Only that they

CHRISTENSEN

Some, 1t showed they worked every week, driving. Others maybe with one
trip a month. I did not make a detailed 11st of that type of who made
trips weekly and who made only one trip a month.

ANDERSON

Would that vary with each Individual driver. One driver might drive all
week and the next week he might not drive at all and come back the following
week and drive a trip, or something of that nature?

CHRISTENSEN

Yes. This could happen. Usually those that worked every week, 1t was
consistent every week and those that maybe once a month, that was 1t, once
a month.

ANDERSON

Maybe I am kind of duplicating myself, but I think 1t 1s Important. Were
there any Indications that there were set times to pick up particular loads
are set times to deliver loads?

CHRISTENSEN

There was not.

ANDERSON

Would you explain to me what ownership of the truck has to do with the
element of control?

CHRISTENSEN

The one that owns the truck decides if that truck is going to move any place.
He is the one that decides who can make that trip or what driver can drive
that trip.

ANDERSON

Was there any indication that the drivers had any control over that. About
when a truck might leave or when it might come back. What it might pick
up for a load?

CHRISTENSEN

There was no indication +if the drivers had any - it seemed they were contacted that there was such a load - would they be interested. They would the
accept it and go by the time schedule for that load, but each load would
vary as to the time schedule.

ANDERSON

You didn't find any employees handbooks or policy or any written policy that
controlled their responsibilities as a driver/ Did you find anything like
that?

CHRISTENSEN

No, I didn't.

ANDERSON

You said you spoke to a couple of the wives, and you seemed to indicate
that they didn't seem to know what the status of their husband was. Is that
what you said?

CHRISTENSEN

Yes.

ANDERSON

Was there any indication as to why they were confused about that?

CHRISTENSEN

They really said that they just didn't know how - they knew their husbands
drove trucks for Mr. Ellison but they didn't know what the relationship was
and I told them that I needed to have them and call me and talk to me and I
asked for a time that I could catch them. We were never able to catch them
on the phone and they never returned the informational requests that were
mailed to them.
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:RS0N

The three copies of the Independent Contractor Agreement that you did have,
they were or they have been signed by drivers, but you whlted out the names
so you didn't know who they were.

ISTENSEN

Yes, that 1s true.

ERSON

As far as you could see, they were executed agreements?

ISTENSEN

Yes

ERSON

Did you, were those three just samples then or were they ?

ISTENSEN

Yes they were samples. I had asked for a copy of 1t and the reason for
whiting out was basically keep anonymous who the Individual was.

ERSON

You didn't particularly then look for a contractor's agreement for each of
these individuals that you have mentioned?

ISTENSEN

No, I did not.

'ERSON

You don't know whether one exists or whether it doesn't?

[ISTENSEN

Not for all of them no.
individuals.

IERS0N

When you first initiated this investigation, did you ask for Mr. Ellison then
what his relationship with the drivers were?

USTENSEN

Yes

JERSON

What did he tell you?

USTENSEN

He said that they were contract labor, that they were able to accept or rejectany load driving his trucks that they wanted to. He also said that they were
free to drive for any other truck driver that wanted their services.

)ERS0N

Did you find any instances of that, where a driver might drive one load for
Ellison, Inc. and another load for some other trucker?

USTENSEN

No.

3ERS0N

I don't believe that I have any other questions.

DGE

Mr. Christensen, do you have anything further to say?

RISTENSEN

No.

DGE

Alright, let's get ahold of our first witness then. Don Bennett.
Mr. Bennett? This is Judge Major - we are ready for your testimony.
going to place you on a speaker phone. Mr. Bennett can you hear me?

But there some contracts for some of these

Mainly because I never looked at any other trucking business.

I am

NNETT

Yes.

DGE

I have with me Drew Christensen, an auditor for the Department. I have Dexter
Anderson, a lawyer representing Ellison, Inc. and Mr. Dave Ellison is also
present. Did you receive some documents stamped as exhibits?

BENNETT

Yts, I did

JUDGE

Do you have those with you? OATH GIVEN AND ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE.
Would you state your name and address for the record

BENENTT

Donald K. Bennett, p.o. Box 334, Orangevllle, Utah.

JUDGE

Thank you. What 1s your occupation?

BENNETT

Heavy Equipment operator and truck driver.

JUDGE

During 1985, did you contract with Ellison to perform a truck driving service

BENNETT

Yeh, I went to work for him drive truck and haul hay from Delta to L.A. and
other flatbed material back,

JUDGE

How did you go about obtaining this contract with Mr. Ellison?

BENNETT

Well, I called him up and he was looking for a driver and a couple of weeks
after he called me and asked me to go to work. We met 1n a cafe in Fillmore
to talk about the job and he told me (intelligible)...how much I would be
making. He did tell me that I would be paying the taxes because it was a
contract and I would have to pay my own taxes, it was the only way to do that
And, well when I signed the contract and stuff, I guess, I was out loading
the hay and he brought me the papers to sign. We were putting hay on the
truck and getting ready to go to Los Angeles. I signed them to get ready to
go and that is about the extent I remember.

JUDGE

How did he tell you you would be paid?

BENNETT

Well, he just told me that I would be paid 15$ a mile and be paid - get a
check from him on regular pay periods.

JUDGE

How often were you paid?

BENNETT

It seems like every two weeks - I can't really remember every two weeks or
just twice a month.

JUDGE

Do you have a document there labeled exhibit #7?

BENNETT

That was #7?

JUDGE

Entitled Wage Schedule?

Yes.

BENNETT

Yeh, I got that.

JUDGE

Does that look familiar?

BENNETT

This gives a detailed list of the payments for trips.
upon this type of schedule.

BENNETT

Well, I guess they was. I didn't know anything about I was told that I
would just be making 15$ a mile and he had a trip deal set up for that
amount for miles.

JUDGE

Were vou Daid for loadina or unloadina the truck?

Were your trips based
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SETT

Yeh. There was a certain fte for unloading and one for loading, depending
upon whether it was done with a forkllft or by hand. It was more 1f I
tver had to load 1t by hand. I never did do that anyway.

GE

Do you have an exhibit there labeled exhibit #9?

NETT

Yup.

6E

Do you recognize that exhibit?

NETT

Well, now there are a couple here t one 1s b

'GE

$ a , 9b and 9 c ?

INETT

Well yea.

IGE

Is that similar to the contract you signed?

INETT

I believe it probably 1s.
it.

)GE

Did you drive any particular tractor-trailer?

JENTT

No, I just drove any one of the ones he had going.
one specific one.

)GE

You never had a particular one that was your responsibility?

WETT

No, I didn't.
Lots of times I would drive a truck for a guy that wanted a
day off, some time off, I would take his truck.

DGE

How did you know whether there was a trip to be made?

NNETT

Well, he would call me up at home, I was living in Holden with my dad, and
he would call there to tell me where the truck and where I had to deliver it.

DGE

Could you have refused to accept that trip?

NNETT

Well, there was a few times I told him I wouldn't go, but it would be like
I don't know, if I didn't want to work for a day I would just tell him I
didn't want to take it.

DGE

So you were free to accept or reject any trip?

NNETT

Well, I guess, more or less, yes.

•DGE

You mention that you delivered the hay to an area in L.A.

!NNETT

Independent C o n t r a c t o r Agreement

I can't tell you for sure but it looks alot like

I was never assigned to

Is that correct?

Yes.

IDGE

Was that the same place you delivered it to every time?
vary?

Did your destination

:NNETT

Well, every time that I hauled hay, down there, when I took it, I took it to
(?) you know, it is in the area of L.A. I never hauled hay any other place.

JUDGE

Did vou haul anything on the rtturn trip?

BENNETT

Yes, we would bring back, well just shingles, anything, about anything you
could you could get on a flatbed.

JUDGE

How did you know whether you had a trip coming back?

BENNETT

Well, when I got down there and got the hay unloaded I would call him and
he would tell me where to go and pick 1t up and where 1t was supposed to be
delivered.
I would go from there.

JUDGE

Did you ever arrange any of these trips yourself?

BENNETT

No, I never did.

JUDGE

Where would you generally pick up the truck?

BENNETT

Well, I picked 1t up over there at Fillmore at other drivers places and
I have picked 1t up at Flowell at his yard.

JUDGE

Where would you return the truck?

BENNETT

Either drop it off at one of the other drivers place that I picked it up
from or down there at Flowell.

JUDGE

Who furnished the gas and oil and maintenance for the truck.

BENNETT

Well, I would fuel up down there - I guess he would. I would fuel up at
Flowell before I left and there was an account sat up in Mesquite, Nevada
where I fueled up - those were about the only two places I ever did fuel.

JUDGE

Did you ever pay for fuel yourself?

BENNETT

No, I didn't.

JUDGE

Did you have any expenses that you incurred performing this driving service?

BENNETT

No, I didn't, just food and stuff like that that I paid for myself.

JUDGE

Anything you would like to ask Mr. Christensen?

CHRISTENSEN

On that last question, when he bought food, was that out of his own pocket?'

JUDGE

Yes, he said he took care of his own food.

CHRISTENSEN

It wasn't reimbursed?

JUDGE

Counsellor, do you have a -some questions for this witness?

ANDERSON

A couple. Mr. Bennett I am Dexter Anderson, attorney for Dave Ellison.
How long did you drive truck for Ellison, Inc.?

BENNETT

About two and a-half to three months, I believe.

ANDERSON

Would that have been in 1984 or 1985?

That is the only thing I had.
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ERSON

According 1;O our records

1t wai during 1985*

NETT

Well, yeh because 1t was October or November, around there when I quit,
that would be right.

ERSON

During that period of time, did you drive truck at all for anyone else?

NETT

No, I didn't.

»ERS0N

Did you have any regular route to follow?

INETT

Well, I just go down 1-15 and right Into L A , and that was the basic set
route to go on.

(ERSON

What I am saying 1s, did you have a regular route and schedule to follow?
In other words, you had to stop 1n certain places and pick up a load and
deliver a load at certain times and be at certain destinations at certain
times.

METT

I guess, in a way you leave here and if you left Sunday you had to be there
Monday morning to unload and then after that it just depended what time you
got reloaded to where you would have to be and unload the next load.

)ERS0N

Well, if you decided that you wanted to spend the night before loading up
and coming back, did you have the right to do that?

WETT

Well, I don't know, I guess you could say you could take that time. I don't
believe it was in the plans at all. No. You were expected to get the hay
off and get loaded as soon as you could and head back out.

DERSON

Did you have a regular time period each week that you worked and time periods
that you had off work. In other words did you go to work each Monday at 8
o'clock and work until 5 o'clock monday afternoon?

NNETT

No, there was no time set up like that at all. It just depended what time
the truck got in to what time I would leave - when I took another guys truck
it just depended when it showed up and got loaded to when I left.

DERSON

On back-hauls, would Mr. Ellison sometimes give you a choice between two or
three back-hauls, and you would take the one you wanted?

NNETT

No, I was never given a choice, he would just tell me where to go and pick
it up and that was it.

IDERSON

Sometimes did you have a choice, did you ever have a situation where you
had a choice?

.'NNETT

Well, personally I never had the situation, he would just tell me where the
loads was and as far as I was concerned that was where I picked it up. I
didn't worry about arguing about it.

IDERSON

Well, I don't mean arguing -

•NNETT

I mean, I was never given -as far as I know, he just- I would call him up and
he would tell me where the load was and where to pick it up and what I was

hauling - that was ill, there was only a mention of one load to me.
to be delivered, to me. He never has told me about two or three loads
and asked me which one I wanted, no.
ANDERSON

Did you keep any hourly record
1n to Mr. Ellison?

of the time that you worked and turn them

BENNETT

No, I didn't.

ANDERSON

How did you report to him as to what you should be paid?

BENNETT

Well, he - I would make the trip down there and I would have the bill of ladl
showing where I lived, where I delivered the hay - would be signed and then
what I picked up from the other outfits would be signed and as far as I know
I just turned them 1n and I was paid on from Fillmore to whereever I delivere
1t -...a certain amount of miles going down and then I was paid for unloading
time and loading time and a certlan amount of miles back from L.A. to Fillmor

ANDERSON

As I understand 1t, you didn't have some form or paper to turn 1n where you
reported your mileage or your time.

BENNETT

No, I didn't.

ANDERSON

They were just figured by the Ellison's from your bill of ladings?

BENNETT

Yeh, I believe he figured them from the map, from one point to the other poin

ANDERSON

Did you keep a record of your own, for your own use of the trip that you made

BENNETT

Well, I really didn't rather than on my log books at the time.

ANDERSON

When you took a trip for another driver who would contact you about that?

BENNETT

Mr. Ellison would.

ANDERSON

You remember times when you didn't want to go on a load so you would tell
Mr. Ellison and you wouldn't have to go, is that correct?

BENNETT

Well, there was lots of times I would tell him I would rather not take it
and he would either talk me into taking it or I wouln't take it - you know
depending on the circumstance or whether I wanted the time off.

ANDERSON

You didn't lose your job because you didn't want to take a load then?

BENNETT

No.

ANDERSON

Did you kind of govern then, how many, govern for yourself, how many loads
you would take during a week?

BENNETT

Yeh, more or less.

ANDERSON

If you wanted to go deer hunting or go on a vacation, you just wouldn't take
the load?

BENNETT

Well, - more or l e s s , yes I believe you could say t h a t .

I wouldn't take any more that I felt like I could handle.
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IERSON

I don't want to put words Into you mouth» I Just want to understand what
you are saying.

INETT

Well (Inaudible) just H k e any other Job P v e ever had. Usually I have
been able to work my time out with my boss. Sometimes I ended up upset or
he ended up upset - kind of the same deal.

)ERS0N

Would you - I appreciate that.

)GE

I have one further question for you Mr. Bennett, did you keep log books?
You mentioned a log.

WETT

Yes, I did.

DGE

What was the purpose of that log?

NNETT

Well, 1t was for your driving hours to go along with the law, how many hours
you worked each week. You had to keep records of that so you couldn't drive
over seventy hours a week.

DGE

Is this a record you kept personally for yourself or did you turn those in to
Mr. Ellison?

NNETT

I turned them into to Dave - you have to have them for the DOT and he had to
have a copy of them.

DGE

So, this is something that is required of a driving operator to maintain for
the law.

NNETT

I don't have any other questions now.

Yes.

IDGE

Anything further Mr. Bennett?

.NNETT

N O , Not that I know of.

IDGE

Anything further that you have of Mr. Bennett. We will excuse you.
Let's get ahold of Paul Boles.
Mr. Boles, this is Judge Major, we are
ready for your testimony. Place you on a speaker phone, I have here with me
Mr. Drew Christensen, field auditor for the Department, Dexter Anderson,
counsel for the employer and Mr. Ellison is also present. OATH GIVEN AND
ANSWERED IN AFFIRMATIVE. Would you please state your name and address.

)LES

Paul Boles,Star Route, Box 244, Fillmore, Utah.

JDGE

Thank you. What is your occupation?

)LES

Truck driver.

JDGE

How long have you been a truck driver?

DLES

Off and on for about 8 or 9 years.

UDGE

Did you have an occasion to contract your services with Mr. Ellison?

OLES

I can't hear you.
"" '

- - . • . - - -•-J.-. .

~^„ •*.,»,•+ +/X sfviua f o r Mr.

-Ellison?

BCLES

Yts.

JUDGE

Would you tell me how you obtained that contract?
the work?

BOLES

I Just was talking with Dave.

JUDGE

Did you know him personally, or did you respond to an ad?

BOLES

No, I knew him personally.

JUDGE

What was your understanding of the contract?

BOLES

I said I would work for him on a - as a contract laborer, basically working
for myself. I would drive loads from Fillmore and Chlno, California and
back.

JUDGE

What was the basis of your payment?

BOLES

Would you say that again.

JUDGE

How was your pay determined?

BOLES

By my performance, how much work I did - just like anyplace else.

JUDGE

Were you paid an hourly wage, were you paid my the mile, by the trip.
you give me a basis of your pay?

BOLES

By the trip.

JUDGE

Did you receive some documents that have been labeled as exhibits?

BOLES

Did I receive some documents?

JUDGE

Along with your subpoena?

BOLES

Yes, I did.

JUDGE

Do you have a document that has been labeled exhibit #7?

BOLES

I am having a hard time, I have been in an accident.

JUDGE

Can you locate that document among the papers you have?

BOLES

Okay.

JUDGE

Have you seen this document before?

JUDGE

Is this the basis of your payment?

BOLES

Yes.

JUDGE

So you received payment according to the trips as outlined in this schedule?

BOLES

Yes, sir.

How you found out about

Would

Wage schedule?

I probably have it hem
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iE

I f you did unloading or loading you were paid according to the fee?

:S

Yes

»E

How did you know whether you had a trip to take?

:S

Through Dave.

»E

How did he contact you?

ES

By phone.

BE

Were you free to accept or reject the trips?

ES

Yes, pretty much so, yeh.

GE

Did you ever reject any trips?

ES

Yes, once.

GE

Why did you reject that trip.

ES

It wasn't actually a trip - it was - I messed up and got down late, he gave
me the option to stay for the weekend or come home. It was up to me.

>GE

Did all your trips originate from Fillmore?

IS

Oh, pretty much,

IGE

You would go down to Chi no, California is this correct, to deliver hay?

.ES

some from Salt Lake.

Yes.

)GE

What about return trips, what would take place there?

.ES

Well we would call Dave and see what he had going back, get a load and come
back. Just like you would do for any other trucker, or anybody else.

)GE

Would he tell you where to pick up a load?

.ES

Yes.

DGE

Did you have an option

of whether you picked that up or not?

LES

No, I never did run across that -

DGE

So, you always picked up the load, then?

LES

Sure.

DGE

Were you given a time or day in which that pickup was to be made?

LES

We just went over and got it.

DGE

So when he told you - you would more or less immediately go and get it at
that time?

BOLES

Sun.

JUDGE

Did you have to return according to any specified schedule?

BOLES

Not usually. Just like any other, as far as driving - you get loaded you
come to your destination.

JUDGE

Could you have taken your time as you pleased, to return?

BOLES

I usually did, yes.

JUDGE

Okay, 1f you wanted to stop somewhere on the road back for two or three days
to fish, could you have done that?

BOLES

That would be hard to answer, I don't know. I never ran across something
like that to happen.

JUDGE

So you basically promptly returned then?

BOLES

I did what I thought was fair - got back the way I would.

JUDGE

Did you incur any expenses in performing these services?

BOLES

You are going to have to explain yourself - road expenses which you have.

JUDGE

Did you pay for any gas or maintenance of the tractor-trailer?

BOLES

No sir.

JUDGE

What expenses did you incur?

BOLES

Things that you need on the road.

JUDGE

Food and lodging?

BOLES

Yeh.

JUDGE

Did you have any particular tractor-trailer assigned to you?

BOLES

Yeh, I did.

JUDGE

Which one was that?

BOLES

No. 10.

JUDGE

Did you have any particular responsibilities for that tractor-trailer?

BOLES

To make sure that it was kept up so we could work.
you won't be able to work.

JUDGE

And what did you do

BOLES

Checked it out before you leave on a long trip to make sure things were
working up to par.

JUDGE

Is this common for truck drivers to do?

Food, whatever else you need.

If you don't keep it up

in order to keep up that tractor-trailer?
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ES

Surt.

6E

While you were driving for Mr. Ellison, did you drive for anyone elie?

ES

Well, yen, I did. Took one load for myself.

GE

Do you want to explain that?

ES

I took a load of hay to Salt Lake.

GE

Who was that for?

.ES

For me.

>GE

You were purchasing the hay yourself?

.ES

Yes.

)GE

For your own use?

.ES

Right.

)GE

Other than that, did you drive for anyone else?

.ES

No.

DGE

Are you still currently working for Mr. Ellison?

LES

Yes sir, I am.

DGE

Who were you working before you worked for Mr. Ellison?

LES

I worked for Budget Stop.

DGE

Did you drive for them?

LES

I did.

DGE

What type of work was that?

LES

I worked graveyard shift - I ran the graveyard shift a truck stop here in tojou

DGE

Do you own a tractor-trailer?

1ES

No, I don't.

DGE

Mr. Christensen, do you have any questions?

IRISTENSEN

No

IDGE
IDERSON

Counsellor?
Paul, this is Dexter Anderson. Did you have any regular work schedule that
you had to follow? Did you have to be to work at such and such a time and
work until such a time?

ANDERSON

Wert you able to govern for yourself, how many trips you might take during
a months time?

BOLES

Definitely.

ANDERSON

So, you would work as much as you wanted to then?

BOLES

Right.

ANDERSON

Or as little as you wanted to?

BOLES

Yes sir.

ANDERSON

I assume that you had to work as much as you could to make a living then?

BOLES

Yes.

ANDERSON

Do you support a family?

BOLES

Yes, I do.

ANDERSON

On the back-hauls, Paul, did you ever have an option between two or three
different loads?

BOLES

Yeh, I have.

ANDERSON

How did you decide which load to bring back then?

BOLES

You mean, myself?

ANDERSON

You just judged for yourself which ones you wanted to bring back?

BOLES

Right.

ANDERSON

How often did that happen?

BOLES

When the opportunity arose. Sometimes you only got one or two loads and
you don't have that option.

ANDERSON

If there was more than one back-haul to come back, Dave would give you that
option?

BOLES

Yeh, I have had that option lots of times.

ANDERSON

Did you have any regular route to follow and pick up points and drop off
points that you had to make? Did you understand that question?

BOLES

No, I don't.

ANDERSON

Well, did you have a regular schedule or route to follow?

BOLES

No, I didn't.

ANDERSON

If you felt tired and wanted to stop and rest, were you free to do that?

BOLES

Yes sir.
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ERSON

I think we may have misunderstood your testimony ibout driving for someone
else. You said you took some hay to Salt Lake - you took that up and sold
1t yourself, didn't you?

IS

Yes.

(ERSON

The hay wasn't for your own use, was 1t?

.ES

No, 1t wasn't.

)ERS0N

So you saw a chance to make some Income for yourself and you did that.

.ES

Yes sir.

)ERS0N

There 1s nothing wrong with that, we just wanted to understand 1t. Did you
keep any hourly record of the number of hours you worked and turn them Into
Dave?

.ES

How many hours I worked?

)ERS0N

I sold 1t to a guy that had some race horses up north.

Yes.

LES

I don't understand what you are saying.

DERSON

You didn't keep a book or something where you wrote the number of hours
that you actually were working.

LES

No, just -

DERSON

Who decided how much you had coming. Did you turn in some sort of a record
or form or something on the number of trips you made?

LES

No, the paper work that was - that you turn in, like you bill of ladings on
each load. Which is true with any business.As far as personal records - no.
Except my own records which nobody kept except me.

DERSON

You kept some personal records for your own information?

LES

Yes.

DERSON

Why did you do that?

1ES

Tax purposes.

IDERSON

So you could check and see if you were getting all the money that you had
worked for?

)LES

Mainly for that and tax purposes.

IDERSON

When you started driving truck, was anything said to you about who had to
pay the taxes?

)LES

You mean my taxes?

IDERSON

Yes.

BOLES

Yts.

ANDERSON

What was said?

BOLES

Well, I was hired on as contract labor and I knew I had to pay my own taxes.
I made arrangements to do so.

ANDERSON

You accepted that, then?

BOLES

Yes.

ANDERSON

I believe that 1s all I have Paul.

JUDGE

Mr. Boles 1s there anything further you would like to say?

BOLES

No.

JUDGE

Anything further Mr. Christensen? Thank you for your time.
Roger Chappeil, please. This 1s Judge Major. Put on speaker phone. Mr.
Chappeil I have with me Drew Christensen, Field Auditor for the Department,
Mr. Ellison 1s present and Dexter Anderson, attorney for employer 1s also
present. OATH GIVEN AND ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. State your name and
address.

CHAPPELL

Roger Chappeil, 120 West 300 North, Fillmore, Utah.

JUDGE

What is your occupation?

CHAPPELL

Truck driver.

JUDGE

How long have you been a truck driver?

CHAPPELL

Approximately 5 years.

JUDGE

Are you currently working for Mr. Ellison?

CHAPPELL

No.

JUDGE

Who are you working for presently?

CHAPPELL

(unintelligible) - in Richfield, Utah

JUDGE

When did you begin working there?

CHAPPELL

Approximately April 15th, this year.

JUDGE

Did you have an occasion to enter into a contract with Mr. Ellison?

CHAPPELL

No.

JUDGE

Did you perform services for Mr. Ellison?

CHAPPELL

Yes, (unintelligible) and as an employee.

JUDGE

When did you begin driving for Mr. Ellison?
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IE

How did you obtain that work?

PELL

On personal contact with Dave Ellison.

IE

Was that contact an attempt to find 1f he had work or did you know that he had
work available. How did that take place?

'PELL

I approached him on the basis I was looking, I didn't know 1f he had any
openings or not, I was looking for work and I approached him.

IE

So at the time, you didn't have work*

>PELL

At the time I was 1n the process of changing - a job change...

IE

Where were you working before you approached Mr. Ellison?

>PELL

I was working as a distributor for Western General Dynamics.

iE

And that was driving?

>PELL

Yes.

iE

Was that as an employee or as a contractor?

>PELL

Contractor.

SE

The current job you have now with Valium, is that as a contractor or employee?

>PELL

Employee.

3E

When you met with Mr. Ellison, did you discuss the basis of your services
you would be performing?

3

Yes, that was brought up. The pay schedule, I suppose you are referring to.

PELL

3E

How did he tell you you would be paid?

PPELL

By mileage, paid by mileage.

3E

Did he tell you a specific amount per mile or by the total miles driven?

PPELL

He would pay me 15tf a mile, plus Toadfng and unloading.

SE

Your loading and unloading, was that per hour or by fee?

PPELL

By fee as indicated on the exhibit -

GE

Are you referring to exhibit #7?

PPELL
GE
PPELL
GE

Yes.
Did you receive your payment according to this trip schedule then?
Yes.
Were vou assianed any particular tractor-trailer?

HAPPEU

A tractor, yes. Trailers, we get a request» you know, sometimes once
e week, depending upon what needs to be done...we were isslgned to one trad

UDGE

What determined what tractor you would be assigned to?

HAPPELL

Well, I don't know unless 1t would be based upon seniority and the amount
of time with the Company.

UDGE

Which tractor were you assigned to?

HAPPELL

No 4.

UDGE

Did anybody else use that tractor?

HAPPELL

No, not unless it was a relief driver.

UDGE

How would you know whether you had a trip available to run?

HAPPELL

We were notified in advance - when we would be leaving and there were always
loads available and ready to go when you got back to the yard.

UDGE

Who would notify you?

HAPPELL

We would check in with Dave on a daily basis and find out - you know.

UDGE

Were you told what time your trips were to leave?

HAPPELL

We were given a general idea of when they needed to be gone. Yes.

UDGE

How much latitude did you have in when you left.

HAPPELL

We generally - early morning and (inaudible) that evening. Give a chance to
get some rest at home, take care of things there before leaving on the
next load.

UDGE

Where did you deliver your loads to?

HAPPELL

The majority went to Chino, California.

JDGE

How are back-hauls handled?

HAPPELL

We would - after loading we would call in and were told where to pick up a-Tc
what we were to pick up then we would go load them and came home.

UDGE

Were you given an option as to whether to take the back-haul or not?

HAPPELL

No.

JDGE

So you did need to take the back-haul?

HAPPELL

Yeh.

JDGE

Were you given as option of which back-haul you might take?

HAPPELL

Most of the time no, that was pretty well predetermined what we would take.
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Were you ever given an option of two or three ind you chose which one?
'Ell

,..generally speaking, 1t was pretty well decided before hand where we
would go.
Did you Incur any expenses 1n performing your driving services.

>ELL

Any expenses other than fuel expenses -

:

Any personal expenses.

>ELL

No.

:

Were a l l expenses Incurred by the E l l i s o n , Inc.?

PELL

Yes.

E

When you returned your tractor-trailer, were you required t o return that
to any specific place?

PELL

G e n e r a l l y w e would park at our homes o r out to the yard.

E

Did you use that tractor-trailer for your personal use?

PELL
E
PELL
£
PELL
IE
'PELL
IE
>PELL
5E

No.
D o y o u have a document which has been labeled as exhibit # 9 , 9a through 9c?
Yes.
Did you sign such a document?
No.
Have you seen this document before that was sent to y o u ?
No.
Were you aware that the drivers were working under such a written document?
No.
Anything further you would like to state, Mr. Chappell concerning y o u r
service that you performed?

>PELL

N o , I think everything has been covered.

3E

Mr. Christensen, d o you have some questions?

ERSON

M r . C h a p p e l l , this is Dexter Anderson, a couple o f questions i f I can.

PPELL
ERSON

Okay.
Did you ever have an option as to whether o r not you would take a load of
hay t o California o r go on a load. Could you say yes o r n o a s to whether
nr nnt

vnii wanted t o QO?

Counselor?

HAPPELL

Y«s, we w e n g1*en that option. If we - the option was available to us.
Someone else could take the load down for us.

NDERSON

Old you ever do that, say no I would rather not go?

HAPPELL

Yes.

NDERSON

Did that jeopardize your job?

HAPPELL

No.

NDERSON

How did you become familiar with the schedule of payments for the trips,
do you remember?
Exhibit #7.

HAPPELL

I knew we were paid out of the monies made and a - the other drivers Indicated we were paid so much for loading and unloading, and after I
started receiving pay checks, there was a breakdown of how we were paid.

NDERSON

Did you use this schedule, exhibit 7, to decide - find out how much you
had coming then?

HAPPELL

Yes, that was the standard - yes.

NDERSON

What - did you keep track of any hours that you spent working?

HAPPELL

No I didn't.

NDERSON

Did you have any regular work schedule to follow, like Monday through
Friday, 8 to 5 - anything like that?

HAPPELL

No. our work was generally scheduled from the time Sunday night, Monday
morning type - we would leave generally Sunday night or Monday morning
we would work - loaded and on our way home Friday evening. We had the
weekends off.

NDERSON

Would you drive than, in such a manner that you could meet your own schedule
as to when you wanted to be home and so forth?

HAPPELL

Pretty much - yes.

NDERSON

If you needed to stop and rest on the way home, or down, were you free to
do that?

HAPPELL

Yes.

NDERSON

If you - did you pay for your own food and lodging on the road?

HAPPELL

Yes.

NDERSON

You didn't pay any of the fuel or oil or repairs or anything?

HAPPELL

No.

NDERSON

Did you have to furnish any other equipment used on the truck?

HAPPELL

No.
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Did you have a discussion with Mr. Ellison whan you starttd driving a
truck as to who was going to pay the taxes and that sort of thing?
No.

[SON

What was your understanding as to who would pay the Income taxes?

'ELL

Well* 1t 1s my understanding that as an employer, he would take care of It.

ISON

How did you actually file your wages • your Income from Ellison, Inc.?
How did you file your 1985 Income tax.

'ELL

I filed 1t like - I kept track of what my Income was and when I filed
my Income tax - we had enough set aside, we could take care of that.

*S0N

So you -

'ELL

That was taken care of - I took care of that when my taxes were done the person that prepared my taxes took care of that for me.

RSON

Did you have somebody prepare your taxes for you?

PELL

Yes.

RSON

Do you know whether it was reported as wages or business income?

PELL

It was reported as wages.

RSON

Did you have any responsibility for maintaining the truck?

PELL

No.

RSON

How long did you actually work for Ellison, Inc.? A couple of months, or

PELL

It was 8 to 9 months.

RSON

You said that you were working as a contractor for Western general Dairies
just tell me basically what you did for General Dairies.

PELL

As an independent contractor - the delivery of dairy products.

:RS0N

You drove a truck?

•PELL
iRSON
>PELL

Yes.
And made deliveries?
Yes.

IRSON

Did you have to pay for any of the fuel or expenses of running that truck?

5

With my own truck - I was responsible for my own expenses, yes.

ERSON

I t was your own truck?

PELL

HAPPELL

At the time, yes.

NDERSON

I don't have any other questions.

IUDGE

Anything further you would like to state, Mr. Chappell?

HAPPELL

No.

FUDGE

Any further questions for this witness?
We will contact Mr. Curt
Wilcox. Mr. Wilcox, this 1s Judge Major, we are ready for your testimony.
Put on speaker phone - I have with me Drew Chrlstensen, Field Auditor
for the Department, Mr. Ell 1 son 1s present and Dexter Anderson, counsellor
for Mr. Ellison. OATH ADMINISTER AND ANSWERED IN AFFIRMATIVE. State
your name and address.

fILCOX

Curtis Wilcox, P.O. Box 1061, Fillmore, Utah.

IUD6E

What 1s your occupation?

IILCOX

Mechanic and driver.

IUDGE

Who are you currently working for?

IILCOX

Dave Ellison, Inc.

IUDGE

When did you begin working for Mr. Ellison?

IILCOX

Oh, dear, well it has been several years, on and off, probably started abou
8 years ago.

IUDGE

Did you work for him during 1984 and 1985?

IILCOX

I would have to go back over my records, I think so.

IUDGE

Did you drive truck for him than?

IILCOX

Uh-huh.

IUDGE

Did you also perform mechanic services?

IILCOX

Mostly just driving a truck.
three and a-half months ago.

IUDGE

How were you paid for your work?

fILCOX

As far as the driving?

IUDGE

Yes.

fILCOX

We were paid - well it was an average for the trip.
drive the truck.

IUDGE

Did you receive payment for loading or unloading?

IILCOX

Yes, - that was a set rate, so much per each load that went on the truck am
so much for each load that went off.

I just started working as a mechanic about

So much per mile to

APPENDIX C

Page 16 o f 21

How did you know whether you had work to perform?
Pardon?
How did you know when you had particular work to perform?
We would call 1n to Dave on the telephone and he would tell us where
we could load or unload. Where we were supposed to go.
Were you free to accept or reject any of the trips?
Oh, yeh, to an extent - there have been a few times when I have just when I couldn't go - I would tell him and he would have to find somebody else.
We were klnda pretty much our own boss.
Did you have back-hauls?
Not at first. At first, we just hauled hay out to L A . and come back
empty. Later on the hay got to where 1t wasn't paying enough to keep
the trucks on so we started bringing freight back.
How were the back-hauls handled?
Well, at first, when we first started doing 1t, I just would talk to Dave
and some of the people I knew and we would find our own load - we had to
keep the trucks loaded by ourselves - I would have to call the people I
knew and got my own load for the freight and then later on, by turning in
the numbers and what I knew, to Dave, he would take care of it himself.
We would just call him to see where he wanted us to load.
When was that that you found your own haul-back.

What year?

Back when I first started driving for him I am not sure of the year.
Would that have been prior to 1980?
1980?
Yeh, you mentioned you worked for 8 years.
Lets see - a could have been either 1980 or around there.
During 1984 and 1985 - Mr. Ellison would inform you where you could pick
up a back-haul?
Un-huh - yeh.
Could you reject those flat back-hauls?
Oh, not usually, because most of the time I wanted to get home and I
would take whatever I could to get home.
Could you come back empty?
On occasion - not very often.

IUDGE

Could you have chosen to come back empty?

fllCOX

A - well I probably could have made that choice, but it pays me more to
load end unload because we got paid wages to pick up the load, whatever
we loaded - paid 1n addition to the mileage wage. So I Just loaded the
truck and came home with a load.

IUDGE

During this period of time, 1984 and 1985, were you driving for anyone else'

IILCOX

You got me on a sticker there because there was a time that I quit working
for Dave and went to work for another company - I am not sure exactly
when that time was. I can't exactly remember that far back.

IUDGE

How long did you work for this other company?

fILCOX

I worked for about three different - positions, I worked as a mechanic
for John Deere and I worked for Goodyear tire repair store here in town
and fixed tires and then I worked for another trucking outfit here in
Fillmore, three different jobs around that approximate period of time, I
am not sure exactly the day and month, I am really not sure, without going
into my records and finding out what I had done.

UDGE

You returned to work for Mr. Ellison after you worked for those three places

ILCOX

Un-huh.

UDGE

How long were you separated from Mr. Ellison?

fILCOX

Oh, probably on and off for about a year and a-half, maybe two years.

UDGE

During 1984 and 1985?

fILCOX

In 1985, I think I worked the complete year, 1984 maybe would have been just
a half a year - partial year. It seems like it was in June of 1984 when I
started back for him the second time. I am really not sure on th exact montt

UDGE

Were you assigned a particular tractor?

ILCOX

Yeh, we were given our own tractor and we were pretty much the operator of
that specific equipment - to take care of it, make sure it was full of
fuel and oil and we kept it clean, whatever, it was pretty well my tractor
and if I didn't drive it I would have to find somebody that would take my
place to make the run.

JDGE

Did you incur any expenses in the maintenance of that tractor?

ILCOX

As far as - ?

JDGE

Fuel, oil, maintenance?

ILCOX

No, we pretty well used Dave had accounts set up and we pretty - for fuel
and oil, we could openly charge most of that. There have been, on occasion,
on a different run, somewhere where there wasn't an account and I would
have to use my expense and then turn in a receipt for reimbursement.

JDGE

Did you ever use that tractor for personal use?
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OX

A • no.

E

Could you have used that tractor for your own personal use?

OX

Oh, y e s , probably at any time 1f I had had a need for 1t.

E

Could you have personally gone and contracted your own work and used
that tractor?

OX

A - well, I don't know as far as that, making a wage o r w h a t e v e r , I don't
know 1f I could have used the tractor for that, but - without checking or
c l e a m l n g 1t with Dave, but I am sure I probably could have, b y going
through the proper channels.

E

Do you own a tractor or trailer?

OX

N o , I don't.

E

Did you receive some documents that have been stamped as exhibits?

OX

Yeh, I did.

E

Do you have exhibit #9?

OX

I don't have them with m e now.

IE

Do you recall signing an Independent Contractor Agreement?

OX

N o , the contract agreement I had with Mr. Ellison was verbal. We had an
understanding as far a s payment and what I would and how I would operate
the truck.

IE

Anything further you would like to state, Mr. Wilcox?

:0X

Not right off. All I can say is that the services I have had with the
Company in the past have been to m y liking. I have enjoyed m y job and
we have had a relatively good understanding between Dave and m y s e l f , I have
enjoyed m y job, a s far as the pay scale, it has been satisfactory. Everything about the j o b , I have enjoyed for the most part.

!E

Thank you Mr. Wilcox.

:RS0N

This is Dexter Anderson a couple o f questions. Could you just characterizewhat you believe your relationship with Ellison, Inc. was a s far a s how you
were working for them?

)0X

A s far as a relationship I felt myself as m y own person, o r own boss like
whenever I wanted to leave town I would call him for a load and then it was
up t o m e to load o r leave t o w n , whatever, in a truck - I would go whenever
I wanted to - he would leave that up to us. He had the loads to be delivered
at a certain point and it was up to m e as a driver to get t h e r e , I could
leave whenever I wanted to o r sleep about whenever I wanted to. There was
no stipulation as to where I had to be at a certain time. I always thought
of myself as m y own boss o r being m y own person. He had requirements o f
loads that needed to be picked up and delivered, but if w e didn't make it
that was just part of the j o b , w e just had to wait until the next day o r

Counsellor d o you have some questions?

DERSON

Were - 1f you didn't want to take a load, what would you do?

LCOX

Well» 1f we didn't want to take a load, we would either tell him that
I didn't want to take a load and have to get somebody else to take 1t or
find somebody to take my truck, you know, and go get the load. For the
most part, the loads we hauled, I never had really too much qualms about
taking or not taking 1t. That was part of the Job, I took the job to
begin with and that 1s Just part of the Job.

PERSON

I take 1t * 1f you had a load to go and you needed to work and earn the
money then?

ILCOX

Right, Yeh, I had to go out and make a living and my job required that I
pick up certain loads and that was just part of the job.

NDERSON

Did you ever have a - well maybe we covered it, on the back-haul, did you
ever have a choice on the back-haul you might bring back?

ILCOX

Yeh, there were times when he only had one parcel of freight to pick up or
a load of hay to haul, so I just took, that was the only thing that was
available. Sometimes on occasions, there were different choices that I
could make. I could take either or.

NDERSON

How would you decide which load you wanted to take then?

II LCOX

Alot of it was just my own knowledge of the load, how easy it was to tie
down or to pick up or to do whatever. Alot of times when we were hauling
the hay I would take the load that paid the most to me. So I could make a
little extra money myself.

ANDERSON

Did you look at it from the standpoint as to how much you could make and
take that load?

rflLCOX

Oh, yeah.

ANDERSON

I don't have any other questions.

JUDGE

Mr. Christensen, did you have any questions?

CHRISTENSEN

I was wondering - he said it was a verbal contract, could he specify what
some of the terms in that verbal contract were?

JUDGE

Did you hear that Mr. Wilcox.
You had a verbal contract with Mr. Elliso
what did that contract consist of?

WILCOX

Okay, when I first started working for Dave I didn't drive the trucks right
from the beginning, this was way back when. When I first started for him
all I did was - he would call me up if he needed a load of hay loaded and
I would work with him loading his bales on the truck. As time went on he
would say would you want to do this and I would say, yeah, I would take the
truck here or there and unload hay here or there, whereever, here locally.
I did not have a license to drive the long hauls, so most of it was just
loading and unloading on a one time basis, he would call me and I would
accept and go load. As time went on we just «• he would ask me do you want
fn tako thp truck and qo here, I would say, what does it pay and he would

I would do that.

+> A f f l f l

hr\Hi
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agreement that ht would pay a certain amount to go to a certain place
and I had the option to either accept 1t or turn it down and let somebody
elso take 1t.
JTENSEN

Who paid taxes on what you were paid? Was there anything withheld -

)X

I am having a hard time hearing you.

JTENSEN

Was there any money withheld for tax purposes or were you accountable for
your own taxes?

)X

No, as far as taxes and what not went, that was just another agreement
that we had that that was not withheld and I covered that myself. I took
care of 1t - my own Income tax and my own medical Insurance - problems or
whatever Incurred. That was all understood that that was my expense.

STENSEN

That 1s all I have.

E

One more question for you Mr. Wilcox, you mentioned on occasion you would
find your own replacement, is this correct?

OX

Yeh, sometimes. Alot of time we had people that were standing by that we
could call on and alot of times Dave would find it himself, but there were
times that he would ask me if I knew of anybody that could take the truck
and I would let some of my friends, in fact I would let my own Dad take
runs for me when I didn't want to go.

E

Any further questions of this witness?

RSON

No

E

Thank you M r . W i l c o x , You a r e excused.
We have M r . E l l i s o n ' s t e s t i m o n y
l e f t . Do you want t o t a k e a short break. L e t ' s c o n t i n u e OATH GIVEN AND
ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. S t a t e your name and t i t l e .

SON

David Ellison

iE

Are you a corporate officer of Ellison, Inc.

SON

Yes, I am P r e s i d e n t

iE

C o u n s e l l o r , would you l i k e t o proceed.

:RS0N

What kind o f business i s E l l i s o n , I n c . ?

SON

Ellison, Inc. is a hay brokerage

"RSON

Who owns t h e t r u c k s used i n t h a t business?

:S0N

Ellison, Inc.

^RSON

Could you t e l l us who b a s i c a l l y owns E l l i s o n , I n c . ?

[SON

M y s e l f , David E l l i s o n and my w i f e Wendy E l l i s o n .

and freight brokerage business and trucking.

NDERSON

Who art the principal officers 1n the corporation?

LIISON

Wendy and David Ellison.

NDERSON

Is anyone else playing a substantial role 1n this business?

LII SON

No.

NDERSON

How are the trucks actually operated? Do you drive the trucks or somebody
else. How 1s that managed?

ILISON

No I do not drive the trucks, I contract with drivers to drive the trucks.

.NDERSON

How long have you been doing that?

ILISON

Eight years.

.NDERSON

During the years 1984 and 1985, how did you have the trucks operating?

ILISON

The trucks were operated by contract laborers.

.NDERSON

We have an exhibit here referred to as exhibit 9a, etc. Are you familiar
with that agreement?

ILISON

Yes.

.NDERSON

Will you tell the Judge what that is?

ILISON

This is an independent contractor agreement I enter into with anyone that i«
driving my trucks so that they understand what their relationship to
Ellison Inc. is. And shall be and what is expected out of them and Ellison.

iNDERSON

Any exceptions to that contract, as far as drivers are concerned during the
years 1984 and 1985?

ILISON

No.

iNDERSON

You ahve seen e x h i b i t # 3 , a l i s t of names are those the names of d r i v e r s
you had during 1984 and 1985?

ILISON

These are employees, d r i v e r s I guess I had.

These are people t h a t

actually

have received compensation from me.
iNDERSON

Did you know each one of those i n d i v i d u a l s

ILISON

Yes.

iNDERSON

Are there any of them that you - that you had an exception with as far as
how they were driving the trucks and how they were paid?

ILISON

personally?

No.

INDERSON

Did you have a discussion with each one of them as you let them drive the
trucks as to how they would be working?

•LLISON

Did I have any exceptions?

No.
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RSON

How were thest driven pild for the driving they did?

SON

We based 1t on a wage schedule, exhibit 7, we determined that by a percentage of the Income off the truck. Set this up for basis of payment.
Originally 1t was based on percentage of the trucks revenue. I guess
we didn't put anything there for loss of the truck. I guess we just
figured we had to have profit for drivers, so we just based 1t on this
and printed up this wage schedule and gave 1t to them and explained that
that 1s the way they would be paid.

.'RSON

Has that been used during the year 1984 and 1985? Basis for payment?

[SON

Yes.

•RSON

Were there any exceptions to that?

tSON

No.

•RSON

You call 1t a wage schedule. Why do you call 1t wage?

[SON

Oh, I put 1t that way so they - I guess that is the only language I knew
for compensation for work that they performed.

ERSON

But it isn't based on an hourly wage, an hourly time?

ISON

No.

ERSON

Some of them have indicated that they worked on a mileage basis. Can you
explain that?

SON

I don't really understand how they accepted that as a rumor because they
were never paid on a mileage basis. I think this wage schedule indicates
that - it can be proven from that. The distance between the origin and
the destination and then the wages that were paid are not 15$ a mile as
the testimony has been given by some of the drivers. I think that they
must have picked it up from other people. They didn't pick it up from
me because I didn't pay them 15$ a mile.

•ERSON

You didn't figure what the amounts they had coming based on the mileage?

.ISON

No, I didn't. They may have estimated that because it is fairly close
in some cases, probably, but I don't think you could find one instance
in there where it is actually 15$ a mile based on those mileages.

)ERS0N

For example, it says - origin Fillmore, Utah and the first destination is
Chino, California and that shows a round trip of $165 and a single trip
miles, it does show mileage there. It shows the number of miles they will
be traveling.

.ISON

Yes, I am sure that they came to their own conclusion - they could figure
that out and estiamte how many it was, but it is not 15$, it just shows
how many miles that is. If you multiply the amount of miles times the
dollar amount it don't come out to 15$.

3ERS0N

Do you know what that comes out?

LLISON

No I don't, I have never figured 1t that way. We Just figure that we
could afford to pay 20% to the driver and so we knew how much income
the trucks would make and so we just based 1t on the percentage that we
could afford to pay the driver. We come up with those figures and
printed them out and we left them that way.

NDERSON

How do you determine then, from what record do you use to determine how
much money a driver has 1n any particular time?

LLISON

Has coming?

NDERSON

Yes

LLISON

Just based on the trips that he has made. I keep track, we have bill of
ladings that tell what the trucks have done. I have - keep track based on
what the driver has turned in to me as to what they did, logs and receipts
for what they did.

NDERSON

Do you have any sort of a route that you require the drivers to follow?

LLISON

No, I don't.

NDERSON

Do you have any kind of a work schedule, an hourly schedule that you require them to follow?

LLISON

No, I don't.

NDERSON

How do you determine when a particular truck might leave and come back?

LLISON

I don't have that - I "assign a load and tell them that load should be
there Monday - that the people on the other end are expecting it on
Monday and to call me when they get it delivered.

NDERSON

What happens if one of the drivers says that he doesn't want to go on that
trip?

LLISON

I call and ask somebody else - give them the opportunity to take the trip.
Just let them know it is available.

NDERSON

What consequence does a driver suffer then, if he doesn't take the trip
you have called about?

LLISON

He has no consequence. I figured that I didn't have the right to impose
a consequence upon somebody that had their free agency.

NDERSON

If they didn't go, they didn't get paid?

LLISON

That's right.

NDERSON

But the next trip you might have would be offered them without any consequences?

LLISON

Yes.

NDERSON

What about the back-hauls?

How would they be arranged?
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I was basically a frtlght broker, I used other trucking companies to
haul my freight for me. I would solicit freight from thlppers and
manufacturers and I would have this log of freight that needed to be
picked up. When my drivers called 1n I would tell them what was available and give them a 11st of those that were available at that given time
and ask them 1f there were any of those loads they wanted. They could
accept or reject any of those loads that I had to offer.
tSON
iON
*S0N
SON
RSON
SON

RSON

SON

You used other trucking companies to haul any of that freight?
Yes.
Would other trucking companies call 1n and ask you for loads

then?

Yes.
That was d u r i n g t h e y e a r 1 9 8 4 and 1985?
Yes.

Did you basically then treat the other trucking companies that would call
in and ask for loads, the same as you would those drivers that were driving
your trucks?
Yes.

RSON

Did you have any work schedule that the drivers had to follow, like certain
times during the day or certain days during the week?

SON

No. There has been several times that trucks - you know, I just assumed
that they would leave Sunday in order to get there Monday. There have
been several times the trucks, as of Monday morning I would drive by
where we keep the trucks and the trucks would still be sitting there, so
without no indication, they just didn't take the load. That was my responsibility, my problem, it wasnft thiers and there was no consequence.

RSON

If the truck was still there Monday morning, then you would find someone
else to take it?

SON

I would call that person first and talk to him for a reason why he didn ! t
take it and give him an opportunity to take it then, if they didn't want
to or couldn't, I would give someone else an opportunity to go then. I
would just ask them to check with me when they were available again.

:RS0N

Do you have any of these people on exhibit 3, that you would say didn't
work full time as a driver?

[SON

Yes, quite, a few of them.

:RS0N

What else did they do besides drive for you?

[SON

They would drive for other people or load or unload freight for other people.
This one has got a pump business, rebuilding and installing irrigation
pumps.

Who was that?
ILISON

J1m Rhodes and Darren Rhodes.
Don Cannon.

iNDERSON

They own their own trucks?

"LLISON

Yes.

iNDERSON

From time to time they would drive for you then?

ILISON

Yes. Roger Chappell owns his own truck. It 1s just. People would tell me
all the time - they were asking for work - I have highway patrolmen and
lots of people that 1s always looking for extra money because they are
looking for spending money so they call me and ask me 1f I have any work
that they can do. So I tell them what 1s available then they accept 1t
or reject 1t.

iNDERSON

Even though they might have other employment.

.LLISON

Yes.

iNDERSON

They are looking for work on a trip basis?

ILISON

Yes.

INDERSON

That is all the questions I have.

IUDGE

Mr. Christensen do you have some questions?

:HRISTENSEN

A couple, he stated that these others have their own trucks.
their trucks or your trucks when they made the hausl?

ILISON

Both.

:HRISTENSEN

How many trucks does Ellison Inc. have on an average?

ILISON

It varies quite a bit.
fair to say.

:HRISTENSEN

One question I was never able to really resolve, who grew and owned the ha*
originally?
That was being hauled?

ILISON

Well, I mostly brokered the hay.

:HRISTENSEN

It was other farmers besides yourself that was growing the hay.
was your own and some was other farmers?

ILISON

Yes.

HRISTENSEN

That's all I have.

IUDGE

When did you become a corporation?

ILISON

June of 1983.

Michael Stevens owns his own truck, so does

They had their trucks parked and were driving for me.

Did they drivi

During 1984, 1985, four trucks, I guess it would be

I bought and sold the hay.
Some of it
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SON

Yts.

E

Did you tver have any problems with any of your driven driving for you?

SON

What do you mean by problems?

E

Problems caused by a driver -

SON

Yes.

E

What type of problems might occur?

ON

Oh, physical damage to the trucks or the cargo.

E

What would happen on those occasions?

SON

I would just turn the claim over to the insurance company.
physical damage insurance on the trucks.

iE

Did you ever have any problems with the drivers performance, how he
handled himself?

SON

Oh, yeh, if I wasn't satisfied with the end result, I would mention it to
them, if it wasn't satisfactory. If they would haul loads in and damage the
load, you know, through neglect, I would let them know that it was not
acceptable.

IE

Did you ever have an occasion where a driver was drinking while driving
or anything like that?

[SON

I never had that problem. I did have one driver that had that problem,
he never was convicted of it just accused of it. I never had that problem.

5E

Any further questions for Mr. Ellison? Any further statements you would
like to make. Any comments or exceptions to any of the information in
these documents by either party? I will take the information that has
been given in the testimony and in the documents and use it as a basis of
issuing a decision. The decision will be in writing and sent to both
parties. This hearing is closed.

I have problems all the time.

I carry a
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DATE OF HEARING:
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APPEARANCES: Employer:
Dave Ellison, President
Dexter Anderson, Atty.
Department:
Drew Christensen
Witnesses:
Don Bennet
Paul Boles
Roger Shappell
Curt Wilcox

PLACE OF HEARING:

Salt Lake/Phone

ISSUE:
Whether individuals included in the auditor's audit dated May 23, 1986 performed
a service for a wage constituting employment. Sections 35-4-22(j)(l), 35-4-22(j)(5) and 35-4-22(p) of the Utah Employment Security Act are quoted on the
attached sheet.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
On May 23, 1986 an auditor for the Department completed an audit of the employer's records. The auditor found numerous truck drivers who received payment for
driving tractor/trailers owned by Ellison, Inc., hereafter employer. The audit
covered the period of second quarter 1984 through fourth quarter 1985. The
auditor determined $191,498 of wages had not been reported to the Department.
The employer is a hay and Freight Brokerage Company. The employer purchases hay
from nearby farms and resells it to buyers in Southern California. The employer
also ships the hay to the buyers in California by trucks which he owns and hauls
freight on return trips. The employer contracts with drivers on an alleged
"Independent contractor" basis. Some of the drivers verbally contracted with the
employer while others entered into a written agreement. The written agreement
purports the driver as an Independent contractor. The tractor/trailers are owned
and maintained by the employer. Operational costs of the tractor/trailers such
as gas, oil, tires, etc. are born by the employer. The employer insures the
trucks and provides for liability coverage of all the cargo shipped.
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The employer assigned the drivers is to which vehicle they will drive. The
drivers ere paid in accordance to a wage schedule compiled by the employer. This
schedule sets forth the amount of payment for loading, unloading, or driving
trips between various destinations.
Whenever a load of hay is to be shipped, the employer will contact a driver and
Inquire whether he desires to take the load. The driver is free to accept or
reject the assignment. However, the employer requires that the hay be delivered
within a certain time frame in order to meet his contractual obligations with the
buyers. The drivers pick up the tractor/trailer at the employees business
in Flowell or at a designated spot in Fillmore. On one occasion, on a Monday,
the employer noticed a loaded trailer sitting in Fillmore which needed to be delivered the same day. The employer informed the driver to either take the trip
that day or he would obtain a different driver.
The employer also acts as a freight broker and has access to freight needing to
be hauled from locations around and about the initial delivery point to points on
or around the return trip. After the drivers deliver the hay they are to call
the employer for information concerning a back haul. If there is more than one
possible back haul available the employer allows the driver to make a choice
which freight he will back haul. Several of the drivers do not recall receiving
an option for back hauls, but were told specifically which freight to back haul.
Several of the drivers, such as Curt Wilcox, work full time for the employer.
Others have worked part time or in between full time jobs. Don Bennet contracted under the same conditions as the other drivers but only worked two to
three months. The employer told him where to pick up the tractor/trailer, where
to deliver the shipment and where to obtain a back haul. Upon return he would
leave the tractor/trailer as instructed at a designated driver's home in Fillmore
or at the place of business in Flowell. The employer did not allow Mr. Bennet or
the other drivers to use the tractor/trailers for personal use. Mr. Bennet
maintained log books for the trips in which he returned to the employer along
with a bill of ladings, etc. upon the completion of each trip. Mr. Bennet
voluntarily quit working for the employer and subsequently filed for unemployment
insurance benefits. While working for the employer, Mr. Bennet did not drive
for other trucking firms nor for himself.
Paul Boles drove for the employer under the same conditions as the other drivers. On one occasion Mr. Boles made an arrangement to purchase and sell some hay
to a buyer in Salt Lake. He made arrangements to deliver the load himself.
Other than this one incident, Mr. Boles drove exclusively for the employer during
his contract with the employer.
Roger Shappell, currently working as an employed truck driver for Diamond K
Trucking, began working for the employer in August 1985. Mr. Shappell approached
the employer looking for full time driving work. Prior to working for the
employer, Mr. Shappell operated as a contractor delivering milk products for
Western General Dairy. He owned his own truck and operated independent of
Western. While working for the employer he drove the tractor/trailers owned by
the employer according to the schedule provided by the employer. He did not sign
any written contracts and believed he was being paid on a basis of $-15 per
mile. While contracting with the employer, Mr. Shappell also worked under the
same conditions as the other drivers.
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Curtis Wilcox hes worked beslcelly full time for the employer under the seme
conditions es the other drivers. However, he hes quit work for the employer on
various occasions and went to work for John Deer as a mechanic, Goodyear Tire as
a tire mechanic, and other trucking firms as a driver.
Michael Stevens worked for the employer under the same conditions as the other
drivers except he owned e truck. However, he did not drive his own truck. He
drove the tractor/trailers provided by the employer, abiding by the same terms es
all of the other drivers which contracted with the employer.
REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
The drivers working for the employer entered into an agreement to perform a
service of driving the employers tractor/trailers to and from destinations
arranged by the employer. They received a payment for their services. Payment
for services may constitute wages for employment subject to the provisions of the
Utah Employment Security Act. To determine whether the service performed
constitute employment the law provides a definition of wages and employment.
Section 35-4-22(j)(l) of the Utah Employment Security Act defines employment as
any service performed for wages or under any contract of hire, written or oral,
expressed or implied. Wages as defined in Section 35-4-22(p) of the Act constitute any remuneration for personal services. Although not defined by the Act,
the Supreme Court in Blamlres vs Board of Review (Utah 584 P. 2d. 889 1978)
stated the "contract of hire" is "construed to include any agreement under which
one person performs personal services at the request of another who pays for the
services." In Fuller Brush vs Industrial Commission (99 Utah 97, 107 P. 2d. 201
1940) and also in Superior Cablevislon vs Board "oT Review (Utah 688 P. 2d. 444
1984) the Court explained "if an individual renders personal services and was
entitled to remuneration based on and measured by such personal services the
person performing the service was under a contract of hire." In this case the
employer entered into a contract with individuals as drivers to haul hay and
freight to and from designated locations as instructed by the employer. They
received payment based upon their service. Therefore, the Tribunal concludes the
payment the drivers received constitute wages for employment under a contract of
hire as defined by the broad perimeters of wages and employment as provided by
the Utah Employment Security Act and interpreted by the Supreme Court.
In the present case some of the drivers, extent unknown, signed an "independent
contract or agreement" which the employer alleges establishes the drivers as nonemployees. Although the drivers may have signed such an agreement, the agreement
does not in and of itself prevent the Department from determining whether an
employment relationship exists. Such agreements which in essence waive an
individual's right to unemployment insurance coverage is void pursuant to Section
35-4-18(a) of the Utah Employment Security Act. Further, the Utah Supreme Court
has stated in numerous decisions that such agreements are Ineffective in keeping
an individual without the purview of the Employment Security Act when by their
own actions they bring themselves within. (Leach vs. Industrial Commission (123
Utah 423 260 P. 2d. 744 1953) and Creameries of America vs Industrial Commission
(98 Utah 571 102 P. 2d. 300 1940).
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Wages for employment are subject for unemployment Insurance coverage unless the
services are exempt by the employer demonstrating to the satisfaction of the
commission that the aervlces in question meet the requirements set forth in the
"ABC" test pursuant to Section J5-4~22(J)(5) of the Utah* Employment Security
Act. The exclusive provision of this Section is conjunctive. Therefore, all
three elements of the test must be met In order for services to excluded from
unemployment insurance coverage. The purpose of this test Is prevent an employer's avoidance of employer obligations with respect to providing unemployment
Insurance coverage by providing another label upon a relationship that is
essentially employment.
Test "A" requires that the individual performing the service be free from control
and direction. If the employer for whom an individual works has the right to
control and direct the way the individual works both as to final results and as
to details of when, where and how the work is to be done then test "A" is not
satisfied. The fact that the principal may allow the individual considerable
discretion and freedom of action may be immaterial. The important factor is the
employer has the right to control and direct.
Although the employer argues that there is no control, the Tribunal finds
considerable evidence demonstrating control and definitely a right of control.
Control is exhibited by the establishment of the wage schedule, scheduling of the
trips, calling in for back haul information, payment for expenses such as gas,
oil, truck maintenance, etc. Further, a definite right of control exists wherein
the employer owns the tractor/trailers which the drivers use. The employer has a
right to insure that the drivers operate such vehicles in accordance to his
desires. This is evident in the fact that the drivers may only use the tractor/
trailers as assigned by the employer. Although a driver may be free to accept or
reject a driving assignment that in itself does not demonstrate independence. By
rejecting an assignment the driver simply expresses that he does not wish to be
employed for that particular job assignment. Further, the employer may effective
discharge any driver by not calling any particular driver for a driving assignment or by giving the assignment to someone else. This is demonstrated when the
employer found a load had not departed timely and the employer told the driver he
would obtain someone else if he did not leave the same day.
Control is also shown in the manner in which the drivers pick up and return the
tractor/trailers and have no right to use them outside of the employer's assigned
trip or approval. The maintenance of logs, bill of ladings, and other paper work
being reported to the employer upon a driver's return also portrays control.
These factors and others stated within the findings portray the employer has
considerable control and right of control such that the Tribunal finds test "A"
has not been met.
Test "B" requires the services to be outside the usual course of business or
outside all places of business. The employer's business is considered as located
in Flowell. The drivers did not work at the place of business except for
incidental loading. Therefore, test tfB" is met.
Test ,'C" requires that that individual performing the service be customarily
engaged in an independently established endeavor. The adverbs customarily and
independently modify the words engaged and established. The language used in
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this statute contemplates thit the Individual be engaged In an independently
established entity having t propriettry Interest to the extent that he can
operate without any hindrance or support from any Individual whatsoever* Its
continued existence does not depend on a relationship with any one employer.
(Fuller Brush Company vs Industrial Commission (99 Utah 97, 104 P. 2d. 201 1940)
and leach vs feoard of Review (123 Utah 423 260 P. 2d. 1953)
Therefore, the drivers in question must operate regularly or habitually, separate
and apart from the employer. The preponderance of the evidence does not support
such a conclusion in the present case. The evidence only portrays Roger Chapel
as ever operating an independent trucking entity. However, such independency
transpired before contracting with the employer when he owned his own truck and
delivered milk for Western General Dairies. There is not such evidence of the
independency continuing during his contract with the employer. Michael Stevens
could possibly be operating his own truck independently, however, he parked his
truck and drove the employees tractor/trailer under the same condition as the
other divers. Thus, the Tribunal does not find the fact in and of Itself that
Stevens owned his own truck demonstrates Independency. The same holds true for
the one trip in which Paul Boles made to Salt Lake on his own.
The drivers contracting for the employer do not incur any of the expenses which
an independent trucker would incur, such as gas, oil maintenance, insurance,
tires, etc. Further the drivers do not have a capitol investment of a tractor/
trailer, etc. as does the employer. These expenses and investments are typical
of an independent entity which could acquire a profit or suffer a loss. The
clientele, buyers and freight supplies belong to the employer not the drivers.
Upon separation from the employer the drivers have no clientele of their own.
The employer bills the clientele and bears risk of any damage, bad debts, etc.
The drivers do not possess a business license, maintain a separate place of
business, competitively bid their work, advertise, etc. as would an independently
established trucker or business such as the employer. These drivers drive for
the employer as trips are available, as determined by the employer whether on a
full time or part time basis. Even though the drivers may be free for others to
hire them, such fact does not make them independent. The drivers would only be
working a series of employment wherein none of the previous mentioned factors are
present. Where the drivers in this case provide only their labor, then the
Tribunal cannot find the evidence demonstrates they are customarily engaged in an
independently established entity as required by Test "C".
Although only one portion of the test need to fail to conclude these services
constitute employment, the Tribunal finds both test "A" and W C" of Section
35-4-22(j)(5) have not been met. Therefore, the Tribunal must hold the services
performed by the drivers constitute employment subject to unemployment insurance
coverage and the auditor correctly included wages paid to these individuals
within his audit findings.
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DECISION:
The Tribunal affirms the Department's decision dated May 23, 1986 holding wages
paid to drivers contracting with the employer constitute wages for service as
employment pursuant to Section 35-4-22(J)(l), 35-4-22(J)(5) and 35-4-22(p) of the
Utah Employment Security Act.

•f^^&^
Administrative
APPEALS TRI
This decision will become final unless within ten days from October 28, 1986,
further written appeal is made to the Board of Review (P. 0. Box 11600, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84147) setting forth grounds upon which the appeal is made.
Jl
cc: Dexter Anderson
Star Route 52
Fillmore, Utah 84631
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Section 35-4-22(J)(l) of the Utah Employment Security Act etates:
"Employment" means any service performed prior to January 1,
1972. which was employment as defined in the Utah Unemployment Compensation Law prior to the effective date of this
act, and subject to the other provisions of this subsection,
service performed after December 31, 1971, including service
in interstate commerce, and service as an officer of a
corporation performed for waoes or under any contract of hire
written or oral, express or implied.
Section 35-4-22(p) states:
"Wages" means all remuneration for personal services including commissions and bonuses and the cash value of all
remuneration in any medium other than cash. . .
Section 35-4-22(j)(5) states:
Services performed by an individual for wages or under any
contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied, are
deemed to be employment subject to this act unless and until
it is shown to the satisfaction of the commission that:
(A) The individual has been and will continue to be
free from control or direction over the performance
of those services, both under his contract of hire
and in fact;
(B) The service is either outside the usual course of
the business for which the service is performed or
that the service is performed outside of all the
places of business of the enterprise for which the
service is performed; and
(C) The individual is customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation,
profession, or business of the same nature as that
involved in the contract of service.
Section 35-4-22(r) of the Utah Employment Security Act states:
Unless services would constitute employment at common law,
"employment" shall not include services as an outside
salesman paid solely by way of commission, and the services
must have been performed outside of all places of business of
the enterprises for which the services are performed.

